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Data Autonomy
Cesare Fracassi*
William Magnuson**
In recent years, “data privacy” has vaulted to the forefront of public
attention. Scholars, policymakers, and the media have, nearly in unison,
decried the lack of data privacy in the modern world. In response, they have put
forth various proposals to remedy the situation, from the imposition of fiduciary
obligations on technology platforms to the creation of rights to be forgotten for
individuals. All these proposals, however, share one essential assumption: we
must raise greater protective barriers around data. As a scholar of corporate
finance and a scholar of corporate law, respectively, we find this assumption
problematic. Data, after all, is simply information, and information can be used
for beneficial purposes as well as harmful ones. Just as it can be used to
discriminate and to embarrass, information can be used to empower and to
improve. And while data privacy is often pitched at ending unauthorized data
sharing, it all too often leads simply to the end of data sharing, period. This
comes at a cost. Data silos can inhibit consumer choice, protect the positions of
powerful incumbents, and reduce the efficiency of markets. The best example of
these costs comes from the financial industry. For more than a century, banks
and other financial institutions have built their information technology systems
to keep financial records as private and nonshareable as possible. While security
concerns can be a primary reason for such closed systems, banks also
understand that financial data is an advantage that can protect them from
market entry and competition. Banks can hold up consumers with unfavorable
rates and inferior products as a result, and a set of market failures make it
difficult for consumers to opt out. First, information asymmetries between
consumers and financial institutions are large and difficult to resolve. Second,
search and switch costs—the difficulty of finding out more information about
the risks and benefits of financial products and of switching to a better financial
service—are high in the financial industry. Finally, individuals struggle to take
*
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advantage of even simple financial strategies to save, borrow, and invest. Data
sharing can help resolve these problems. The emergence of a new regulatory and
technological framework called “open banking” raises the possibility of
consumers being able to task trusted intermediaries with automatically
analyzing their financial data, nudging them to achieve their goals, and
switching them to better products, all in order to reduce the substantial
inefficiencies in their financial lives. There is one problem, however. A
combination of market failure and regulatory ambiguity has led to a situation
in which data is limited, siloed, and inaccessible, thereby preventing
individuals from using their data in efficient ways. Ultimately, this Article
contends, resolving these problems will require us to replace the clarion call of
“data privacy” with a new, more comprehensive concept, that of “data
autonomy”—the ability of individuals to have control over their data. Data
autonomy balances the need for data to be protected and secure with the need
for it to be accessible and shareable. In this Article, we lay out a set of key
principles that grant individuals a legal right to data autonomy, including a
right of ownership over data, as well as obligations on institutions to safely
share standardized and interoperable data with third parties that consumers
so choose. Perhaps counterintuitively, the only way of expanding consumer
welfare and protection today is by breaking down the barriers of data privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, “data privacy” has vaulted to the forefront of
public attention. Major newspapers have written exposés about the
myriad ways in which technology companies are exploiting and
monetizing our data.1 Congress has held hearings to question tech
CEOs on the data practices of their businesses.2 And regulators have
begun to turn their attention to the topic as well, issuing fines and
enacting rules to both punish and prevent shoddy data privacy
protections.3 All these efforts have been driven by the widespread
perception that the pervasive use of technology in today’s world has
seriously harmed the legitimate privacy interests of citizens.
In response to these concerns, scholars have proposed a variety
of reforms. Some have argued that we need to impose fiduciary duties
on technology platforms, requiring them to act in the best interest of
their users.4 Others have argued that we need to create a new “right to
be forgotten,” allowing users to force internet companies to remove

1.
See Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/
location-tracking-cell-phone.html [https://perma.cc/7DN4-BS8B]; Sam Schechner & Mark Secada,
You Give Apps Sensitive Personal Information. Then They Tell Facebook., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22,
2019, 11:07 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-give-apps-sensitive-personal-informationthen-they-tell-facebook-11550851636 [https://perma.cc/V4A7-67H4]; Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Found
Your Data. It’s for Sale., WASH. POST (July 18, 2019, 7:00 AM CDT), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/18/i-found-your-data-its-sale/
[https://perma.cc/
4BED-LUDA]; Carly Minsky, Is Consumer Protection Legislation Fit for Purpose?, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3901dd14-ca55-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0 [https://
perma.cc/5S7S-JTC5].
2.
See Kevin Roose & Cecilia Kang, Mark Zuckerberg Testifies on Facebook Before Skeptical
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/politics/
zuckerberg-facebook-senate-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/P3UP-9ZR9]; Ryan Tracy, Tech Giants
Draw Fire in Congress, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2019, 7:05 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
congress-puts-big-tech-in-crosshairs-11563311754 [https://perma.cc/QHK5-WVWP].
3.
See Emily Glazer, Ryan Tracy & Jeff Horwitz, FTC Approves Roughly $5 Billion Facebook
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2019, 6:43 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-approvesroughly-5-billion-facebook-settlement-11562960538 [https://perma.cc/FJT8-RVKH]; Craig A.
Newman, The S.E.C. Dusts Off a Never-Used Cyber Enforcement Tool, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/business/dealbook/voya-sec-cyber.html
[https://perma.cc/
9NL8-ZEZH]; Tony Romm, DOJ Issues New Warning to Big Tech: Data and Privacy Could Be
Competition Concerns, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2019, 2:22 PM CST), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/08/doj-issues-latest-warning-big-tech-data-privacycould-be-competition-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/3RUN-JHTP].
4.
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183, 1205 (2016); Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for
[https://perma.cc/UW6W-FDYN]; Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make
Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/ [https://perma.cc/Y28R-QJF8].
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personal information from their websites.5 Still others assert that we
need to grant individuals broader rights to sue technology companies
for data privacy violations.6 The assumption underlying these proposals
is that we need to raise greater protective barriers around data.
As scholars of corporate finance and corporate law, we find this
assumption troubling, or at least incomplete. Data, after all, is simply
information. Information can be used for any number of purposes, some
of which are problematic, of course, but many of which are in fact quite
desirable. Just as information can be used to discriminate and
embarrass, it can also be used to empower and improve.7 Indeed, one of
the core goals of financial regulation is to encourage, and in some cases
require, the disclosure of useful information in order to make markets
fairer and more efficient.8 Data sharing, thus, is a tremendously
powerful tool for social good.9
This is not to say that data privacy is not valuable as well. It
certainly is, and any well-designed regulation needs to be deeply
concerned with protecting it.10 But the ability to share information is
just as important as the ability to hide it. Too often, data privacy
5.
See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015
WIS. L. REV. 321 (calling for mechanisms to remove criminal convictions from private background
check databases after records are sealed or expunged); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman,
The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43 (2013); Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife,
90 N.C. L. REV. 1643 (2012).
6.
See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109 (2014); Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The
New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 235 (2012); Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 2025, 2052 (2014); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104,
109 (2019).
7.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, Examined
Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
8.
See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 334 (1979); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and
the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984); Paul G.
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047–
48 (1995). But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2011).
9.
On the importance of information sharing for empowering better decisionmaking and
more efficient transactions, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970); Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell,
Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing, 90 Q.J. ECON. 651, 664 (1976); Michael
Spence, Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs, 90 Q.J. ECON.
51, 52 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193 (1998); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000); James P.
Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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reforms have tended to favor the latter value over the former. 11 While
they have been aimed at preventing unauthorized data sharing, they
have often simply prevented data sharing at all.12 This comes at a cost.
Data silos⎯where data is stored by a company, but in a way that it is
inconvenient to access or use⎯can inhibit consumer choice, protect the
positions of powerful incumbents, and reduce the efficiency of
markets.13 We need to find a better balance.
This Article explores these problems by examining the world of
financial data, an area that has seen an explosion of interest in recent
years from Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and, just as importantly,
Washington.14 Despite the fact that the financial sector plays a very
important role in the economy, efficiency within the sector has
remained remarkably stagnant over the last century. The low level of
productivity growth can be traced to weak competition in the financial
sector, as incumbents enjoy oligopoly rents and underinvest in
technological innovation.15 Three main reasons can explain this lack of
competition. First, the financial regulatory environment is complex and
fragmented, causing high regulatory compliance costs and high barriers
to entry. Second, banks hold up consumers with expensive and lower
quality services, as information asymmetries between consumers and
financial institutions are large and hard to resolve, and the search and
switch costs involved in identifying and comparing financial products

11. See discussion infra Section II.E (examining how regulatory solutions to the issues
identified have played out in other jurisdictions).
12. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for example, contains a broadly constructed privacy rule,
prohibiting banks from “disclos[ing] to a nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal
information [about a consumer],” but also includes an exception providing that the requirements
for data privacy do not apply for data sharing “with the consent or at the direction of the consumer.”
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a), (e)(2).
13. See discussion infra Section I.A (exploring theories that explain why the financial sector
has made little progress with respect to efficiency despite massive technological advances).
14. See Masters of the Universe: The Rise of the Financial Machines, ECONOMIST (Oct. 3,
2019), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/10/03/the-rise-of-the-financial-machines [https://
perma.cc/VUZ6-RDAT]; Rochelle Toplensky, Data and Deregulation Fuel the Global Fintech Boom,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2019, 5:38 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/data-and-deregulation-fuelthe-global-fintech-boom-11574419137
[https://perma.cc/YA8N-8FUP];
Emily
Birnbaum,
Lawmakers Call for FTC Probe into Top Financial Data Aggregator, HILL (Jan. 17, 2020, 11:13
AM EST), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/478766-lawmakers-call-for-ftc-probe-into-topfinancial-data-aggregator [https://perma.cc/Y528-879T].
15. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 50, 76 (1991); Victor Stango, Pricing with Consumer Switching Costs: Evidence from
the Credit Card Market, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 475, 489 (2002); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation
More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 242–48 (2018) [hereinafter Van Loo,
Making Innovation More Competitive]; Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition,
Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 213 (2019) [hereinafter Van Loo,
Broadening Consumer Law]; Carin van der Cruijsen & Maaike Diepstraten, Banking Products:
You Can Take Them with You, So Why Don’t You?, 52 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 123, 124 (2017).
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are high.16 Finally, individuals often do not act as purely rational
decisionmakers in their financial lives.17 They fail to save, they fail to
diversify, and they fail to take advantage of simple strategies that could
substantially improve their financial positions.18
Data can help solve these problems. Over the last decade, a
number of financial technology (“fintech”) companies have sprung up,
better serving consumers by automating and optimizing financial
transactions.19 Using a combination of big data, artificial intelligence,
and mobile computing, these fintech companies have attempted to
resolve the inefficiencies that bedevil consumers in the market. 20 They
have both the expertise and the incentives to learn about consumer
preferences, search for information about financial products, and take
advantage of price differentials.21 Their innovations have the
potential to dramatically improve individuals’ access to beneficial
banking services.
But the promise of fintech has been held back by one essential
feature of today’s financial landscape: the lack of data. While financial
institutions create and manage enormous amounts of data on a daily

16. See Liran Haim, Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy in Financial Markets, 32 J.L. &
COM. 23, 36–44 (2013); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft
Protection, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1146–47 (2012).
17. See Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and
Arm’s-Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three
Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002); Edward
B. Rock, Foxes and Hen Houses?: Personal Trading by Mutual Fund Managers, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1601, 1621–22 (1995); Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement
Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 41 (2015); James J.
Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, For Better or for Worse: Default
Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 81–82
(David A. Wise ed., 2004); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your
Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 774
(2000); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic
Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276–77 (1991).
18. See discussion infra Section I.B (explaining that although the arrival of fintech and big
data have dramatically altered the amount of information available to investors, the U.S. financial
sector has not yet seen efficiency gains).
19. See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 863 (2019); Benjamin
P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisers Rescue the Retail
Market?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 97–100 (2018).
20. See Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 63 (2018);
Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 241–44
(2019); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1173–74 (2018)
[hereinafter Magnuson, Regulating Fintech]; William Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the
Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 159, 163–64 (2018) [hereinafter Magnuson,
Financial Regulation].
21. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 833–36 (describing how AI can leverage dispersed data to
make more effective decisions for consumers).
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basis, individuals struggle to access and share that data with others.22
A combination of market failure and regulatory ambiguity makes it
difficult, and sometimes impossible, for consumers to grant fintech
companies access to their financial data. This has led to a situation in
which data is limited, siloed, and inaccessible, with large financial
institutions possessing tremendously valuable data but failing to share
it with others.23 Again, there are perfectly valid reasons why financial
institutions might be hesitant to do so. They worry about privacy
violations, cybersecurity risks, and liability exposures, all of which are
significant.24 But without control of their own financial data,
individuals struggle to overcome the many obstacles to efficient
financial decisionmaking.
This Article argues that resolving these problems will require us
to replace the clarion call of “data privacy” with a new, more
comprehensive concept—“data autonomy.” Data autonomy balances the
need for data to be protected and secure with the need for it to be
accessible and shareable. It grants individuals a set of rights over their
data that wrests control over data back from the large institutions that,
until now, have maintained a vice grip over it. And while data autonomy
requires important changes in legal rights and responsibilities, it is not
entirely without precedent. It is largely consistent with a wave of new
regulations being put in place across the globe, often referred to as
“open banking” rules, that seek to address the lack of data sharing
in financial services. Perhaps counterintuitively, the only way of
ensuring consumer protection today is by breaking down the barriers of

22. See Nathaniel Popper, Banks and Tech Firms Battle Over Something Akin to Gold: Your
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/business/dealbook/banksand-tech-firms-battle-over-something-akin-to-gold-your-data.html [https://perma.cc/7Y4C-SP7W]
(suggesting that big banks limit data access to avoid ceding control over that data); AnnaMaria
Andriotis & Emily Glazer, Facebook and Financial Firms Tussled for Years Over Access to User
Data, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2018, 5:30 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-soughtaccess-to-financial-firms-customer-data-1537263000 [https://perma.cc/DY2J-DX6U] (describing
banks’ hesitancy to give Facebook access to consumers’ financial information).
23. See JPMorgan’s Clampdown on Data Puts Silicon Valley Apps on Alert, AM. BANKER
(Mar. 26, 2019, 9:18 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/jpmorgans-clampdown-ondata-puts-silicon-valley-apps-on-alert [https://perma.cc/5WAF-73ZW]; Laura Noonan, JPMorgan
to Ban Fintech Apps from Using Customer Passwords, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2020), https://
www.ft.com/content/93dcfc52-210b-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b [https://perma.cc/L9AM-LJ3R].
24. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, REPORT ON
OPEN BANKING AND APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES 13–15 (2019), https://www.bis.org/
bcbs/publ/d486.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGL3-MWBF]; Open Banking, Open Liability: Accountability
Issues for Open Banking APIs, ASHURST (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-andinsights/legal-updates/open-banking-open-liability-accountability-issues-for-open-banking-apis
[https://perma.cc/J3EH-FA9T].

334

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2:327

data privacy.25
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the
competition problems that beset the financial industry, with a
particular focus on services for consumers. It then turns to the ways in
which innovative, data-focused fintech could help improve competition
within the industry and provide better results for consumers. Finally,
it explores the current barriers, both market-based and law-based, that
inhibit greater competition.
Part II sets forth a pathway to reform. It explores how a variety
of legal changes aimed at creating true data autonomy for individuals
would help resolve inefficiencies in the sector. It argues that these
reforms would include rights of ownership and access to personal
financial data, as well as obligations on financial institutions to
maintain personal financial data in interoperable and secure formats.
Finally, it explores how such “open banking” structures have been
implemented in other countries and the lessons that can be drawn from
their experiences.
Part III considers the broader implications of shifting from a
privacy-focused conception of data to an autonomy-focused one. Giving
individuals control over their data will raise new risks and concerns,
and regulators will need to be wary of emerging practices that might
exploit or defraud newly empowered consumers. Part III focuses on
three areas that will require special vigilance. First, regulators will
need to develop robust measures for ensuring that individuals consent
in meaningful and thoughtful ways before their data is shared with
others. Second, regulators will need to be wary of antitrust violations,
as the diffusion of competitively sensitive data may lead to collusion
between competitors. Finally, regulators will need to be mindful of the
problem of cost, as the development and maintenance of comprehensive
data platforms will be expensive and, thus, may spur further incentives
to monetize data in problematic ways.
A final caveat: lest we be misunderstood, we do not believe that
data autonomy as a concept is opposed to data privacy. A world in which
individuals do not have the ability to keep their information, financial
and otherwise, out of public view is a dangerous and unappealing one.
We do not advocate for one. Instead, we view this Article as an effort to
highlight the ways in which data privacy can be used as an excuse for
resisting innovation and stifling competition. Data autonomy, rightly
understood, restores to the individual the right both to hide and to
25. See Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of
Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1583 (2019) (arguing that privacy undermines consumer
protection and other regulatory goals).
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reveal, to confide and to disclose. We believe it better protects
individuals in an increasingly data-dependent world.
I. THE ROLE OF DATA IN FINANCE
Finance suffers from a competition problem. Despite the clear
need for better products to facilitate consumer wealth and security,
innovation within the sector has lagged, at least partially because there
are few incentives for traditional actors to innovate. Fintech startups,
on the other hand, have strong incentives to innovate but lack the
means to do so, primarily because they struggle to access the data they
need to provide better services. This Part explores the structural causes
of the lack of competition within the financial sector, with a particular
focus on consumer banking. It then discusses the ways in which data
could be used to mitigate or solve these problems. Finally, it describes
how market failure and legal uncertainty have raised obstacles to
greater use of data to empower individuals and improve financial
services. It concludes by discussing potential avenues for reform.
A. The Competition Problem in Finance
Finance plays a crucial role in the economy. Through their
provision of credit, liquidity, and payment and investment services,
financial institutions allocate resources to their best uses, thereby
making markets more efficient.26 In economic terms, banks and other
financial institutions intermediate between borrowers and savers,
providing the former with capital to invest and the latter with
investment opportunities.27 This is a crucial role that has led financial
institutions to dominating positions in the U.S. economy. Finance is
now one of the largest sectors in the United States, contributing 7.4
percent of GDP in 2018.28 The financial sector’s importance to the
economy also appears to be growing. In 1880, the quantity of
intermediated assets was approximately equal to GDP, whereas today,

26. See EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 3–15 (1972); Joseph
E. Stiglitz, The Allocation Role of the Stock Market: Pareto Optimality and Competition, 36 J. FIN.
235, 235 (1981); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).
27. See FAMA & MILLER, supra note 26, at 3–15.
28. This number includes both finance and insurance. See Int’l Trade Admin., Indus. &
Analysis Unit, Financial Services Spotlight: The Financial Services Industry in the United States,
SELECTUSA, https://www.selectusa.gov/financial-services-industry-united-states (last visited Oct.
4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7BPC-GW3A].
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it is four times GDP. 29 The income of financial institutions has grown
proportionately. The revenues of financial intermediaries increased
from 2 percent of GDP in 1880 to 7.4 percent of GDP in 2018.30
Despite the growing size and profits of financial institutions,
efficiency within the sector has remained remarkably stagnant. One
common measure of efficiency within the financial sector is the ratio of
the income of financial intermediaries to the quantity of intermediated
assets.31 By representing the unit cost of intermediating one dollar of
assets, the ratio is thought to be an accurate way of understanding the
efficiency of financial institutions in performing their key function.32 It
turns out that the intermediation ratio within the financial sector has
remained stable at around 1.5 to 2 percent for over a century.33 This is
a striking statistic. The world has undergone tremendous technological
change during this time, from the invention of computers to the creation
of the internet. And yet, despite all these technological advances⎯many
of which fundamentally altered the way that financial services
work⎯there has been no increase in efficiency, with the unit cost today
roughly the same as it was around 1900. The stability of the ratio is
particularly striking given that almost all other sectors in the economy
today are much more efficient than they were a century ago.34
This raises an obvious question. Why has finance not grown
more efficient over time? While many theories have been asserted, two
theories (one market-based and one law-based) have gained widespread
acceptance. The first theory holds that the lack of efficiency gains in the
financial sector can be explained as a result of the excess rents that
incumbent financial institutions extract from their customers (so-called
“hold-up” costs).35 Banks use two main channels to hold up their
customers and charge them more than a competitive market would
sustain: (i) informational advantages and (ii) switching costs.36

29. See Thomas Philippon, Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the
Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408, 1411 (2015).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1409.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1412.
34. See id. at 1434 (noting that although in the retail and wholesale sectors, “IT investment
coincides with lower prices and lower (nominal) GDP shares,” the inverse is true in finance).
35. See GERALD EPSTEIN & JUAN ANTONIO MONTECINO, ROOSEVELT INST., OVERCHARGED:
THE HIGH COST OF HIGH FINANCE 2, 16–19 (2016), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/RI-Overcharged-201606.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NZB-J8S6] (“[E]conomic
rents are the incomes that some individuals or institutions receive over and above what would be
required to incentivize them to engage in a given economic activity.”).
36. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 218 (2008) (informational
advantages); Oren-Bar Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2010)
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First, the process of lending to borrowers is fraught with
asymmetric information, where the lender has significantly less
information than the borrower about the credit quality of the
borrower.37 This is a classic example of adverse selection that can lead
to market breakdowns.38 Banks thus invest a significant amount of
resources in assessing the creditworthiness of individuals in order to
make more accurate loans. But once banks acquire this information,
they can then charge borrowers rates that are higher than what the
borrowers would pay if asymmetric information were not present. After
all, even if consumers are overcharged by a bank, they will find it
difficult to instead reapply for a loan at a different bank, because doing
so is often interpreted by other banks as a negative signal of their
creditworthiness. This is a typical information hold-up problem.39
Another avenue for holding up customers is through bundling
services.40 Most financial institutions today offer a variety of services,
from checking and savings accounts to brokerage services, from bill
payment solutions to credit cards.41 Many consumers choose to use their
bank for several or even all of these services. While this may be
convenient for customers, it also introduces a large transaction cost for
moving to a new bank. The search and switch costs are high and, thus,
serve as a strong preference for the status quo.42
The second explanation for the inefficiency of the financial sector
focuses on the role of regulation.43 In particular, it asserts that the
complex and fragmented regulatory environment for finance creates
(switching costs); Daniel Hemel, Note, Regulatory Consolidation and Cross-Border Coordination:
Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 28 YALE J. ON REGUL. 213, 222 (2011) (switching costs).
37. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481,
1495–96 (2006).
38. See Akerlof, supra note 9, at 493 (describing adverse selection in the insurance industry
as occurring when healthy policyholders discontinue coverage, causing the insurer to bear an
increased proportion of risks and higher claim costs).
39. See Rajan, supra note 17, at 1367–68 (explaining that because bank financing requires
firms to share information with the banks, “firms forsake informed and seemingly more efficient
sources of debt finance [from banks] to borrow from less informed arm’s-length sources”).
40. See Aluma Zernik, Overdrafts: When Markets, Consumers, and Regulators Collide, 26
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2018).
41. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 2 (Feb. 26, 2019).
42. See Chris M. Wilson, Market Frictions: A Unified Model of Search Costs and Switching
Costs, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1070 (2012) (explaining how high costs constrain the ability of
customers to change suppliers).
43. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REGUL. 253, 270 (2007); Henry N. Butler &
Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
677, 679 (1988); Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 39, 75 (2009).
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large barriers to entry in the sector, thereby impeding potential
competitors from introducing change.44 Currently, a multitude of
federal and state regulatory agencies possess overlapping oversight of
the U.S. financial system. Banks and credit unions are regulated by the
Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and the National
Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), as well as by state agencies,
while broker-dealers and market intermediaries are overseen by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, numerous self-regulatory organizations (e.g.
FINRA, NFA, FASB), and state regulators.45 Institutions wanting to
become banks must first receive charters, a process that is lengthy,
expensive, and uncertain.46 The complexity of this arrangement, as well
as the overlapping compliance requirements, discourages new and
innovative companies from entering the financial sector. 47 As a result,
incumbent financial institutions can enjoy an oligopolistic competitive
environment with large market power, excess rents, and low pressure
to innovate.48
A final and related point is that all of these factors have played
a role in contributing to rising public distrust of financial institutions.
In a recent survey by the Reputation Institute, the banking sector
ranked fifteenth out of sixteen industries for general reputation, only
barely edging out the telecommunications industry for the worst
reputation.49 A recent Gallup poll found that sixty-two percent of
respondents had only some, very little, or no confidence in banks.50 The
tech industry, on the other hand, despite all its recent criticism,
generally inspires greater levels of trust in consumers, even with
respect to the provision of financial products.51

44. See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 587–92 (2019).
45. See Lee Hudson Teslik, The U.S. Financial Regulatory System, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS. (Oct. 1, 2008), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-financial-regulatory-system [https://
perma.cc/7QG6-MWAP].
46. See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 15, at 260.
47. See Allen, supra note 44, at 591.
48. See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 242–43 (2017) (describing
an analogous phenomenon in the context of unionized labor).
49. Alan Kline, 2019 Reputation Rankings: The Biggest Movers, AM. BANKER (June 30, 2019,
9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/2019-reputation-rankings-the-biggest-movers
[https://perma.cc/L6QX-FEYA].
50. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidenceinstitutions.aspx (last visited Dec. 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6RQT-KVLU].
51. See, e.g., Statista Rsch. Dep’t, United States: Is Your Overall Opinion of Google as a
Provider of Financial Services Positive, Neutral or Negative?, STATISTA (June 3, 2015),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/433041/united-states-google-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/DBF5-
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In summary, the financial sector is large, profitable, inefficient,
and untrusted. It is thus an obvious target for technological disruption.
As Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, warned his
shareholders in 2014: “Silicon Valley is coming.”52
B. The Promise of Fintech
In recent years, a number of fintech companies have sprung up
to attempt to disrupt the financial sector using new technologies and
tapping into new markets.53 These companies have tended to focus on
addressing two of the most severe financial frictions: asymmetric
information and switching costs. By using technology to automate and
improve decisionmaking, they promise to lower frictions in the financial
sector and bring more competition into the market for financial
products.54 Among other things, it is hoped that they will expand access
to and usage of financial products and provide cheaper, more
convenient, and better targeted financial service products.55
The explosion in fintech investment over the last decade has
been spurred by several technological breakthroughs. 56 Nowadays,
machines can replicate many intellectual tasks, including search and
planning, reasoning and knowledge representation, perception, natural
language processing, and social interactions.57 These advancements
have transformed traditional enterprises and created new business
opportunities in the financial service industry.58 They have also paved
the way to entirely new financial services across the globe: marketplace
lending, equity crowdfunding, robo-advising, cryptocurrencies,
blockchains,
algorithmic
trading,
mobile
payments,
and
person-to-person cross-border remittances all emerged out of
fintech innovations.59
One particularly promising sector of the fintech market focuses
on the better usage of data. One way to reduce information asymmetry,
of course, is to collect, analyze, and share more information. And there
are tremendous amounts of relevant data to be analyzed. Indeed,
E7GN] (presenting survey results where ninety-five percent of respondents reported either a
positive or neutral view of Google as a financial services provider).
52. See Jamie Dimon, Letter to Shareholders, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 29 (2015)
[https://perma.cc/FV22-CC7G].
53. See Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, supra note 20, at 1173–87.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 20, at 264–78.
57. Id. at 269–75.
58. Id. at 272–78.
59. Id.
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nowadays, most economic and social activities are digitalized in some
form. Around 33 zettabytes (10 21) of data were created, captured, or
replicated in 2018, and the number continues to grow, more than
doubling every other year.60 Furthermore, the ability to analyze and
process that data is growing as well. Under the well-known Moore’s law,
computing and storage power doubles roughly every eighteen to twentyfour months.61 Just as importantly, advancements in data analytics,
such as machine learning and neural networks, allow companies to
analyze greater amounts of data more accurately and in a shorter
amount of time.62
The arrival of big data means that lenders and investors now
have a much greater amount of information than in the past to decide
on the creditworthiness of borrowers or the expected return of an
investment.63 For example, bank account transactions include a trove
of data useful for lending decisions, from disposable income to cash flow
stability.64 Sharing such information with lenders could allow
borrowers to get loans on better terms by providing the lenders with
greater security about the borrowers’ financial behavior.65 A more
comprehensive use of data might lead to even greater efficiency gains.
By aggregating and merging disparate data, companies could more
accurately understand, predict, and optimize consumer demand and
use of financial products.66 For example, fintech companies could
manage the personal finance of an individual by analyzing their credit
card transactions, bank direct deposits, spending patterns, investment
returns, and risk profiles.67

60. See DAVID REINSEL, JOHN GANTZ & JOHN RYDNING, THE DIGITIZATION OF THE WORLD:
FROM EDGE TO CORE 3, 6 (2018), https://www.seagate.com/files/www-content/our-story/trends/
files/idc-seagate-dataage-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2HJ-6S5Z].
61. It should be noted that in the last few years, a growing number of commentators have
called into question whether Moore’s law still holds. See Shara Tibken, CES 2019: Moore’s Law Is
Dead, Says Nvidia’s CEO, CNET (Jan. 9, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/moores-lawis-dead-nvidias-ceo-jensen-huang-says-at-ces-2019/ [https://perma.cc/9VY2-B5YN].
62. William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 337,
339–40 (2020).
63. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014); Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer BitCredit and Fintech
Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781, 820 (2018); Matthew A. Bruckner, Regulating Fintech Lending,
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., June 2018, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Bruckner, Regulating];
Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5 (2018) [hereinafter Bruckner, The Promise and Perils].
64. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 63, at 5.
65. Cf. id. at 8–18 (describing drawbacks of the “black box” created by the credit scoring
system in which opacity undermines fairness and efficiency).
66. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 817–18.
67. Id. at 826–30.
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Despite the great promise of fintech and its data-focused
approach to finance, however, there is little empirical evidence that, at
least so far, it has led to greater efficiency within the United States.
While technology is drastically changing the business models of most
industries, from media and telecommunication to retail, the adoption of
new technologies in the broader U.S. financial sector, and the financial
inclusion and efficiency that comes with it, is still limited.68 In a recent
survey of fintech adoption rates, the U.S. market ranks twenty-fourth
out of twenty-seven countries.69
The low level of fintech adoption in the U.S. financial sector can
be explained partially as a result of the unique nature of the U.S.
market. In particular, the U.S. financial sector has the odd feature of
being both fragmented and concentrated. This strange structure has
made it especially resistant to competition. Let us focus first on its
fragmentation. As of 2018, there were more than 4,700 FDIC-insured
commercial banks with over 81,000 bank branches.70 This is an
enormous number of firms and is perhaps best understood by
examining it in comparison with other countries. The United Kingdom
has only three hundred banks.71 Canada has only eighty-eight.72 Europe
has around two-thirds the number of banks per capita that the United
States does.73 The fragmentation of the U.S. market might seem to
suggest that the banking industry should be highly competitive, as
oligopolistic behavior is usually associated with high industry
concentration. But this is where the concentration of the market
becomes relevant. Over the last twenty years, the banking industry has
in fact been undergoing a significant consolidation, with a decline of
over forty percent in the total number of banks, accompanied by a rise
in the share of very large “supermarket” financial institutions: the five
68. See ERNST & YOUNG, G LOBAL FINTECH ADOPTION INDEX 2019, at 6–7 (2019),
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/financial-services/ey-globalfintech-adoption-index-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSS2-NWKH].
69. Id.
70. See F. Norrestad, Number of FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks in the United States From
2002 to 2018, STATISTA (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/184536/number-of-fdicinsured-us-commercial-bank-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/44R7-WYE7]; F. Norrestad, Number
of FDIC-Insured Commercial Bank Offices in the U.S. 2000-2019, STATISTA (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/193044/number-of-fdic-insured-us-commercial-bank-offices/
[https://perma.cc/H4U9-SBYE].
71. Overview of Banks in the UK, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/
resources/careers/companies/top-banks-in-the-uk/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
33HF-EVSM].
72. Focus: Fast Facts About the Canadian Banking System, CANADIAN BANKERS ASS’N (Aug.
26, 2020), https://cba.ca/fast-facts-the-canadian-banking-system [https://perma.cc/7SZ6-YNQ4].
73. See Commercial Bank Branches (Per 100,000 Adults), WORLD BANK, https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5 (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
R2SP-AR3F].
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largest banks in the United States accounted for around twenty-eight
percent of total assets of large commercial banks in 2000 but now
account for forty-seven percent.74 The banking industry, thus, despite
its fragmentation, is also quite concentrated. It has a large number of
very small banks and a small number of very large ones. While the
small ones struggle to find the resources needed to innovate, the large
ones have limited incentives to do so due to their oligopoly rents and
government guarantees as systemically important financial
institutions (sometimes colloquially known as “too-big-to-fail” firms).
This is a recipe for a competition-resistant market.
This problem, of course, creates an even greater opportunity for
fintech companies. If small banks lack the ability to innovate, and large
banks lack the incentives to do so, fintech companies have both. If they
can gain access to the financial data of consumers, they should be able
to provide better services at lower cost than other financial institutions
and, in doing so, trigger greater competition within the sector. But the
fintech industry relies on one key input: data. And as the next Section
explores, data has become increasingly hard to access and share.
C. The Data Problem
For centuries, financial institutions have built their information
systems to prevent loss, either in the form of theft or, more recently,
cybersecurity breaches. Even today, the core banking systems of many
U.S. banks rely on mainframe-based transaction systems, introduced in
the 1970s, to allow centralized processing of large volumes of
transactions with reduced downtime and high data security. But this
core banking system is now antiquated and unable to keep up with the
needs of the modern financial system. Over the last decade, fintech
companies have introduced new technologies (such as screen-scraping)
aimed at surmounting these problems and at accessing bank accounts
to retrieve the data they need. In recent years, however, financial
institutions have responded by introducing new barriers around
consumer data, again making it difficult for consumers to access and
share their data with others. 75 In some cases, banks have banned
customers from sharing their passwords with third-party fintech

74. See Large Commercial Banks Statistical Release, FED. RSRV. BD., https://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/ (last updated June 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JYA4TT5D] (identifying the five largest banks); Peter Eavis & Keith Collins, The Banks Changed.
Except for All the Ways They’re the Same., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/09/12/business/big-investment-banks-dodd-frank.html [https://perma.cc/FA7N9MHT] (showing concentration of the banking industry over time).
75. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 838–39.
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companies.76 In others, they have introduced platform changes that
shut out fintech companies.77 In still others, they have required fintech
companies to enter into burdensome data sharing agreements before
allowing consumers to share data with them.78 More generally, banks
have been slow to adapt their technological infrastructure to allow
consumers to access and share financial data with other parties.79
If this were a more competitive sector, one might expect that the
market would help resolve the problem. If consumers truly valued the
ability to share their financial data with third parties, they might
choose banks or other financial institutions that provided that service.
After all, in functioning markets, when there is a demand for a specific
service, it is generally expected that, where feasible, a market will arise
to supply it.80 But, as mentioned before, the financial sector is far from
a perfect market. Several hurdles prevent a market for data sharing to
arise naturally. First, because search and switch costs are large in the
banking sector, consumers may well not shift to banks that spring up
offering better services.81 Consumers, after all, use the same financial
institution for a multitude of financial transactions, from direct deposits
to paying bills and mortgages, and moving all these services to a
competing bank is time-consuming and expensive.82 Second, until a
sufficient number of institutions allow data sharing, the value of data
sharing by a single institution is muted.83 In other words, there are
strong network effects to data sharing and, until a network develops,
there will be few incentives for individual banks to suddenly offer it.84
For example, personal financial management tools are valuable only if
they aggregate all the financial information scattered among all
financial institutions. Potential market entrants are thus waiting for
76. Noonan, supra note 23.
77. See Mary Wisniewski, Fintechs’ Vulnerability Apparent in Capital One Data-Access Flap,
AM. BANKER (June 29, 2018, 12:12 PM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fintechsvulnerability-apparent-in-capital-one-data-access-flap [https://perma.cc/XUS5-ENB4].
78. See Penny Crosman, Wells Fargo Strikes Data-Sharing Agreement with Plaid, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 19, 2019, 7:00 AM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/wells-fargostrikes-data-sharing-agreement-with-plaid [https://perma.cc/8TNZ-BBZW].
79. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 838–39 (noting other examples of banks restricting
fintech’s access to customer data).
80. See Irena Asmundson, Supply and Demand: Why Markets Tick, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/suppdem.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/T7XJ-ZCRN].
81. See discussion supra Section I.A (noting that the cost of switching service providers
creates a barrier for many consumers).
82. See discussion supra Section I.A.
83. See Peter Zhegin, Data Network Effects for an Artificial Intelligence Startup, MEDIUM
(Dec. 8, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/data-network-effects-for-an-artificial-intelligencestartup-7f6fab10ba85 [https://perma.cc/Q5PK-HJLY].
84. See id.
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more data to become available and for the regulatory environment to
become clearer regarding data access and sharing. Consumers, in turn,
are waiting for market entrants before they switch banks, a classic
chicken-and-egg problem.
Furthermore, incumbent financial institutions have a strong
interest in preventing data sharing in the first place.85 Banks have little
incentive to share their data with third parties if they are not being paid
to do so, as customer data is valuable and gives banks a competitive
advantage over others.86 Relinquishing it to third parties erodes banks’
competitive position. Just as importantly, the third-party fintech
companies that gain access to the data may well use it in ways that
harm the bank that gave it. They might, for example, recommend that
the customer transfer his or her money to a different bank that pays a
greater interest rate or refinance his or her mortgage with another
lender offering better terms. So even if there is a strong customer
demand for greater data sharing, banks will still have incentives to
limit or prohibit it.
The current financial regulatory environment has not resolved
this market failure. Financial regulators have, for the most part, taken
a top-down approach to banking oversight, focusing more on stabilizing
the financial system rather than spurring innovation and efficiency.87
Proposals to break up big banks similarly fail to address the main
causes of the market failure in the financial system: asymmetric
information and switching costs.88
In order to resolve these problems, we need to develop a financial
regulatory structure that focuses on data. But this structure must not
simply increase rights to data privacy. Privacy is certainly an element
of data rights, but it is not the only value. Just as important is the right
of individuals to share, use, and access their data. Data autonomy, thus,
embraces not just data privacy, but also data sharing, and includes a
much more comprehensive array of rights and obligations.
While introducing a concept of data autonomy into financial
regulation would require substantial changes to current law, it is not
entirely without precedent. Around the globe, countries are
85. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 838–39.
86. See id. (“[Banks] cite[ ] privacy concerns [as a reason to not share data] . . . , but
those explanations must be viewed with some skepticism because the intermediaries pose a
competitive threat.”).
87. See Schwarcz, supra note 36, at 194.
88. Cf. Sheelah Kolhatkar, How Elizabeth Warren Came Up with a Plan to Break Up Big
Tech, NEW YORKER (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/how-elizabethwarren-came-up-with-a-plan-to-break-up-big-tech
[https://perma.cc/2M5K-ASY5]
(outlining
Senator Warren’s antitrust plan to prohibit big tech companies from both owning and participating
in an online marketplace).
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experimenting with new financial regulatory structures to address the
lack of data sharing in financial services.89 These regulations, often
referred to as “open banking” rules, enable consumers to give thirdparty providers access to their financial data and accounts in a secure,
easy, transparent, and inexpensive way. Under these structures,
fintech companies can use application programming interfaces (“APIs”)
to automatically access a consumer’s bank account, analyze financial
transactions, move money around, pay bills, and make investments.
Consumers could, for example, completely outsource their personal
financial management to certified third-party providers that analyze
their spending and income flows, shop for the best credit card and loan
rates for them, and even automatically switch them to better services.
Open banking rules aim to open up data in the financial sector in order
to lower asymmetric information and search and switch costs that
inhibit competition. Thus, while data autonomy would mark a dramatic
shift in the legal rules governing data, it is not implausible or even
unprecedented. We now turn to the question of just precisely what it
would require.
II. DATA AUTONOMY
We have argued that the financial system suffers from a lack of
competition. This lack of competition is caused by a combination of
market frictions and legal uncertainty. As a result, consumers have
failed to benefit from many of the innovations that have been made
possible in recent years by advancements in big data, artificial
intelligence, and fintech more generally. Thus, we have argued,
financial regulation must be recast in a comprehensive manner in order
to facilitate the kinds of technological innovation that have largely been
missing from the financial world.
Now we will turn to the question of reform. This Part lays out
what data autonomy might look like in financial regulation and what
new legal rules will be necessary in order to implement it. In particular,
this Part argues that data-focused financial regulation must be guided
by four key principles. First, it must establish that consumers own their
financial data. Second, it must require financial institutions to grant
access to that data to the persons and firms that consumers so choose.
Third, it must set forth rules on the structure and terms of that access,
with a focus on creating interoperable standards. And fourth, it must
create strong incentives for firms throughout their financial ecosystem
89. See discussion infra Section II.E (taking “lessons from abroad” about implementing
regulatory structures that account for data sharing in the financial sector).
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to establish and maintain proper cybersecurity procedures. This Part
also surveys how other jurisdictions have addressed these problems and
draws lessons from their experiences.
A. Ownership
The first prong of data autonomy in financial regulation must
focus on the ownership of financial data. In particular, it must
establish, in clear and incontrovertible terms, that consumers own their
financial data.90 Property rights in data would bring with them all the
separate benefits that property law entails: the right to use, destroy,
exclude, and transfer.91 Consumers would, as a result, have not just the
ability, but the right to see, compile, aggregate, delete, and sell their
financial data as they see fit, and without the permission of the
financial institutions with which they transact.
Data ownership would seem to be a simple proposition, but it is
not as incontrovertible as it might appear at first glance.92 When asked
90. The importance of clarity here is hard to overstate. As will be discussed further below,
property rights in the digital era have been deeply controversial and, to date, are still largely in
flux. And without clear data ownership rules, participants have little certainty about the terms
under which they are interacting with others. As property scholars have long recognized, this is
problematic from many perspectives. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring
Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1022 (2008) (“There cannot be ownership
in land without some clear idea of who owns the land, what land is owned, and what rights accrue
to the owner as a result of her status.”); Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and
Freedom: On Taking Our Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345, 352 (2006) (“Individuals working to
grow their assets must be supported by clear laws defining their property rights.”); Henry E.
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1797 (2004) (“Property rules have
informational advantages.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in
Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (arguing that the fact that property “is
required to come in standardized packages that the layperson can understand at low
cost . . . constitutes a deep design principle of the law”).
91. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1390–1420 (2013) (exploring the features and functions of these core rights under
property law).
92. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for
Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220 (2018) (surveying international approaches to data
ownership); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 784 (2007) (“[T]he classic justification for legal entitlements
protected by a property rule depends on the ability to define and enforce property rights
effectively.”); Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 392–93 (2003) (arguing that state and federal law “fail to
provide coherent and systematic protection of personal information” on the internet); Stacy-Ann
Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 432
n.36 (2018) (highlighting “the inadequacies of existing privacy frameworks in remedying consumer
harms that may occur as a result of data disclosures”); Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and
the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (2011) (“It is unclear what legal right or interest,
if any, consumers have in their personal information.”); Andreas Boerding, Nicolai Culik,
Christian Doepke, Thomas Hoeren, Tim Juelicher, Charlotte Roettgen & Max V. Schoenfeld, Data
Ownership: A Property Rights Approach from a European Perspective, 11 J. CIV. L. STUD. 323, 325
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whether a consumer owns the information in their bank account, one
consumer rights advocate admitted, “You don’t. You totally don’t.” 93 The
Financial Data and Technology Association, an industry consortium,
has similarly argued that “the right for the consumer to control their
data . . . is murky.”94 Large financial institutions, while addressing the
terms of data exchange, have avoided taking public stands on the issue.
This position of ambiguity is in stark contrast to many other
technology sectors. For example, Mark Zuckerberg has stated in
testimony before the Senate that “people own all of their own content”
on Facebook.95 Google’s terms of service for its cloud storage accounts
explicitly state that “[w]e do not claim ownership in any of your
content.”96 Both of these companies have established rights for users to
delete and transfer their data if they so choose.
The lack of clarity on the legal structure of financial data
ownership has led to complaints about potentially harmful effects in the
financial industry. In 2016, the director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), Richard Cordray, stated that “we are
gravely concerned by reports that some financial institutions are
looking for ways to limit, or even shut off, access to financial data.” 97 In
2019, Senator John Kennedy introduced a bill, entitled the “Own Your
Own Data Act of 2019,” which, if enacted, would provide that “[e]ach
individual owns and has an exclusive property right in the data that an
individual generates on the internet.”98
While the basic principle⎯that consumers own their financial
data⎯is straightforward, how exactly that principle might apply to the
financial sector, and in particular how it might be limited, raises
difficult legal and policy issues. The initial problem, of course, is

(2018) (arguing that European property law provides “sufficient common principles to establish a
comprehensive concept of data ownership”).
93. See Colin Wilhelm, Is Your Bank Data Yours?, POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/10/11/who-owns-financial-data-000538
[https://perma.cc/7J5J-5XBR].
94. See Letter from Steven Boms, Exec. Dir., Fin. Data & Tech. Ass’n, to House Task
Force on Fin. Tech. (June 20, 2019), https://fdata.global/north-america/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/
2019/06/FDATA-FinTech-Task-Force-Letter-for-Record-6.25.19-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/557XX3CG].
95. See Transcript of Zuckerberg’s Appearance Before House Committee, WASH. POST (Apr.
11, 2018, 8:53 PM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/11/
transcript-of-zuckerbergs-appearance-before-house-committee/ [https://perma.cc/KF77-YRG8].
96. See Google Drive Terms of Service, GOOGLE DRIVE HELP, https://support.google.com/drive/
answer/2450387?hl=en (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JB4R-BYFB].
97. See Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks at Money
20/20 (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarkscfpb-director-richard-cordray-money-2020/ [https://perma.cc/E6CT-NGTD].
98. See Own Your Own Data Act, S. 806, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019).
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defining just what counts as consumer financial data.99 Banks, credit
card companies, lenders, and others possess tremendous amounts of
information about their customers and users, and establishing the
boundaries of which parts of that information belong to the financial
institution and which parts belong to consumers is inevitably
complicated.100 Take, for example, a typical savings account at a bank.
On one side of the spectrum, we have the consumer’s personal
information, such as name, social security number, driver’s license
number, etc. This would appear quite clearly to be the consumer’s data
and thus owned by the consumer, not the bank. On the other side of the
spectrum is information that can be seen by the consumer but that is
not directly related to them, such as the variety of accounts that the
bank offers or their branch locations. This type of data would clearly be
bank-owned data, not consumer-owned data.
But in between these clear cases lie a number of trickier
scenarios. Is the interest rate offered by the bank the bank’s data or the
consumer’s? If the bank provides budgeting tools or enhanced
information about payments that would be unavailable to the consumer
operating on their own, is the data produced by those tools the bank’s
or the consumer’s? Much of this information is considered by financial
institutions as confidential, meaning that its release to other parties
might harm the institution itself. And yet, this information is vital to
ensuring that consumers understand their financial lives. Credit events
are an even starker example of the complexity of drawing ownership
lines when it comes to financial data: when borrowers miss a payment,
or outright default, does this information belong to the borrower or to
the bank? If it belongs to the borrowers, they might have the right to
ask the bank to erase the negative events and thus compromise the
ability of banks to discern between good and bad borrowers.
Fortunately, the concept of data ownership has received
significant attention from scholars and policymakers, and models for
sorting through these problems exist. For example, under the
administration of President Barack Obama, the Office of Management
and Budget issued guidance on the protection of individual data within
government offices.101 This guidance sets forth the scope of what
99. See William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1148–52,
1164–68 (2019); Joseph V. DeMarco & Brian A. Fox, Data Rights and Data Wrongs: Civil Litigation
and the New Privacy Norms, 128 YALE L.J. 1016, 1024–26 (2019).
100. See Stacy Cowley, Banks and Retailers Are Tracking How You Type, Swipe and Tap, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/business/behavioral-biometricsbanks-security.html [https://perma.cc/X8LH-A7N7]; Andriotis & Glazer, supra note 22 (describing
negotiations between Facebook and financial firms over access to customers’ financial data).
101. See OFF. OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, M-10-23, GUIDANCE FOR
AGENCY USE OF THIRD-PARTY WEBSITES AND APPLICATIONS (2010).
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personal data is, what the requirements are for accessing and using it,
and the duties that government officials have with respect to it. In the
health sector, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”) establishes ground rules on how healthcare companies
handle personally identifiable information.102 The European Union’s
much-debated General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) also
includes extensive sections defining the boundaries of personal data
and the rights of consumers over it.103 All of these are potential models
for defining consumer-owned financial data. Given the increasing value
of data to consumer choice and market efficiency, we are inclined to
adopt a more expansive definition of consumer data in order to ensure
that consumers have control over their information. But regardless of
the precise definition adopted, the very process of identifying the data
that is owned by financial institutions and the data that is owned by
consumers will itself produce important benefits. Greater clarity about
the legal status of personal financial data is essential to improving
competition within the sector.104
B. Access
But data ownership alone is not enough to ensure that
consumers can use their financial data in the ways that they desire.
Regulators must also focus on requiring banks and other financial
institutions to grant access to this financial data, both to consumers and
their desired delegates, in convenient and reasonably cost-effective
ways. After all, if consumers own their financial data, but financial
institutions limit the ways in which they may use it, then data
ownership alone will be insufficient to ensure a competitive landscape.
Data access rights, thus, are integral to establishing data autonomy in
financial regulation.105
Again, it would appear largely unobjectionable that consumers
should have rights to access their financial data and to show this
102. See Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of Big
Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 597 (2014); Sharona Hoffman
& Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 336 (2007).
103. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard,
71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 375–80 (2019); W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data and
the GDPR: Providing a Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 287, 314–15,
328 (2019).
104. On the importance of clear property rules to efficiency, see supra note 90.
105. Here, for example, is how one consumer rights group describes the problem:
Over the last several years, some U.S. financial institutions have sought to institute a
range of technical and administrative hurdles that would interfere with consumers’
ability to use third-party tools. These financial institutions have moved to limit the
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financial data to whomsoever they choose. Indeed, of all the planks of
data autonomy in financial regulation, access to data has the clearest
legal grounding. Dodd-Frank section 1033, after all, requires financial
institutions to make information available to consumers concerning
their financial services, including “information relating to any
transaction, series of transactions, or to the account including costs,
charges and usage data.”106 The CFPB has bolstered this requirement
by issuing a set of principles on data sharing practices, and these
principles include specific sections devoted to access. They include, for
example, provisions related to data scope, usability, and control, and
they provide in-depth descriptions of the kinds of data that financial
institutions should share with consumers and third-party fintech
companies.107 Thus, the right to access and share financial data stands
on firm legal ground.
But despite the current regulatory framework, in recent years
financial institutions have raised a number of technological and legal
barriers to this access.108 They have restricted access to account

amount of data that consumers can share, or are seeking to define bilateral agreements
with onerous contractual terms that would restrict consumers’ ability to take full
advantage of marketplace solutions that would empower them to improve their
financial state. As a result, there are an escalating number of cases where consumers
are excluded from engaging with fintech services best suited to improve their financial
well-being.
Examining Opportunities and Challenges in the Financial Technology (“Fintech”) Marketplace:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
115th Cong. 130–32 (2018) (Letter from the Consumer Financial Data Rights Group to the H. Fin.
Servs. Comm.).
106. Section 1033 provides:
Subject to rules prescribed by the Bureau, a covered person shall make available to a
consumer, upon request, information in the control or possession of the covered person
concerning the consumer financial product or service that the consumer obtained from
such covered person, including information relating to any transaction, series of
transactions, or to the account including costs, charges and usage data. The information
shall be made available in an electronic form usable by consumers.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1033(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5533(a).
107. See Consumer Protection Principles: Consumer-Authorized Financial Data Sharing and
Aggregation, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 3 (Oct. 18, 2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/documents/cfpb_consumer-protection-principles_data-aggregation.pdf [https://perma.cc/G78Z2H96]:
Financial data subject to consumer and consumer-authorized access may include any
transaction, series of transactions, or other aspect of consumer usage; the terms of any
account, such as a fee schedule; realized consumer costs, such as fees or interest paid;
and realized consumer benefits, such as interest earned or rewards.
108. See AM. BANKER, supra note 23 (describing how financial firms have resorted to using
platforms that “restrict[ ] how much and how often apps can tap information, while also setting
contractual limits on what they can do with it later”).
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information,109 they have blocked traffic from some fintech servers,110
and they have prevented customers from viewing their data through
fintech portals.111 Increasingly, financial institutions have refused to
grant access to consumer-oriented fintech startups until those startups
agree to burdensome data sharing agreements.112 Financial institutions
have listed a number of reasons for these obstacles, including ensuring
the security of customer data released to third parties, clarifying where
liability lies in the transaction, and protecting their own systems from
cybertheft.113 But regardless of the cause, these obstacles have made it
difficult, and costly, for consumers to access and share their data in
convenient ways. Adding to the dilemma, the CFPB has been
significantly more active in ensuring data privacy than in ensuring
data sharing.114
Thus, in order to ensure that financial markets are efficient and
transparent, financial regulators must go further in creating,
explaining, and enforcing data sharing rights. For one, they must set
forth, in unambiguous language, the terms and conditions on which
financial access occurs. Perhaps just as importantly, they must make
clear that failures to grant access on such terms will be sanctioned. As
the post-Dodd-Frank era has shown, financial institutions have many
ways to restrict or limit otherwise clear statutory obligations. 115 Until
there are strong incentives for them to grant consumers and fintech
startups greater access to their data, it is likely that they will refrain

109. See Jennifer Surane, Capital One Restricts Third-Party Data Access, Upsets Customers,
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018, 6:00 AM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0627/capital-one-restricts-third-party-data-access-upsets-customers [https://perma.cc/T7P5-SGYR].
110. Cf. Penny Crosman, The Truth Behind the Hubbub over Screen Scraping, AM. BANKER
(Nov. 12, 2015, 2:15 PM EST), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-truth-behind-thehubbub-over-screen-scraping [https://perma.cc/MF4U-62PM] (describing potential reasons why
banks are justified in blocking fintech companies from accessing their servers).
111. See Robin Sidel, Big Banks Lock Horns with Personal-Finance Web Portals, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 4, 2015, 7:30 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-lock-horns-with-personalfinance-web-portals-1446683450 [https://perma.cc/4CVW-AKR8] (describing how banks have
become more protective of their customers’ personal information).
112. See Penny Crosman, U.S. Bank Embraces Open Banking with Data-Sharing Agreements,
AM. BANKER (Sept. 24, 2019, 10:24 AM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/us-bankembraces-open-banking-with-data-sharing-agreements [https://perma.cc/W9PG-TMKS].
113. See id.; Crosman, supra note 110; AM. BANKER, supra note 23.
114. See Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by Default: Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB,
2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 531, 536–38 (2018).
115. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A
Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in
International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2011) (“Financial institutions
and other businesses seeking lower levels of regulation can now move from nation to nation
seeking weaker regulatory standards, producing a race-to-the-bottom in international financial
regulation.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 932 (2012).
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from making the costly and time-consuming changes that will be
necessary to facilitate efficient and competitive data sharing.116
One of the key problems in financial data sharing is that there
are few compelling business reasons for banks to engage in it.117 In the
financial industry, banks tend to be net producers, not consumers, of
data.118 In other words, banks possess tremendous amounts of financial
data, and they have limited need to gain access to the data of others. As
a result, the concept of data sharing is often viewed within large banks
as a cost-creating department, not a revenue-creating one.119 To be sure,
if banks fail to provide fintech firms with access to their platforms,
while their competitors do, they may lose customers in the long-term.120
But consumers are often held up by banks because of asymmetric
information and search and switch costs, and the executive
decisionmakers at banks, focused on immediate returns and with
limited time horizons, may well discount the value of these longterm benefits.121
Furthermore, data sharing appears to cut against the trend in
the industry towards data privacy. In recent years, regulators have
increasingly pushed financial institutions to strengthen their
authentication procedures and cybersecurity processes in order to
ensure that hackers do not gain unauthorized access to customer

116. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1253
(1999) (“Insofar as corporate law is regulatory, it provides incentives and disincentives to the major
actors in the corporate enterprise—directors, officers, and significant shareholders—through the
threat of liability.”).
117. See discussion supra Section I.C (describing the financial sector’s reluctance to hand over
data to fintech firms).
118. See Maria Aspan, Why Banks Still Struggle with Big Data, AM. BANKER (May 21, 2014,
12:52 PM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-banks-still-struggle-with-big-data
[https://perma.cc/H4CR-AEJ9] (describing why banks have been less successful with deploying the
massive amounts of customer information they collect).
119. For a discussion of the perception of transaction costs and value creators in the corporate
environment, and the extensive role that business lawyers can have in this paradigm, see Ronald
J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J.
239 (1984).
120. See, e.g., Lauren Brodsky & Liz Oakes, Data Sharing and Open Banking, MCKINSEY &
CO. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/datasharing-and-open-banking [https://perma.cc/M9M2-VN3W]
(discussing
the competitive
opportunities that open banking and data access provide to banks).
121. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247,
249 (2010):
It is now well-recognized that by enabling executives to cash large amounts of equitybased and bonus compensation before the long-term consequences of decisions are
realized, pay arrangements have provided executives with incentives to focus
excessively on short-term results and give insufficient weight to the consequences that
risk-taking would have for long-term shareholder value.
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data.122 Banks have responded by making it more difficult and
cumbersome for customers to access their financial accounts.123 But
while this shift may have improved data security, it has also set up new
obstacles for data sharing. If, for example, a bank only allows customers
access through two-factor authentication models, some fintech startups
may be excluded from access. The tension between data sharing and
data privacy could not be starker.124
Given these dynamics, regulatory pressure to improve and
increase data sharing within the financial industry is both desirable
and necessary. Without it, it is likely that efforts to create open,
transparent financial markets will be slow and halting. The right to
access, and share, financial data must, at a minimum, include
affirmative rights by consumers and fintech companies to see and use
their financial data in convenient forms and on reasonable terms,
backed up by monetary penalties if this access is obstructed or delayed.
C. Interoperability
Data-oriented financial regulation must also focus on creating
interoperable standards for data sharing. Just as it is important to
create clear ownership rights over data, and clear access rights, it is
also important to ensure that this data is stored and managed in
standardized ways. Interoperability is integral to the proper
functioning of a market in data, and without it, transaction costs and
market leverage may threaten to impede competition within the sector.
While ownership and access rights are justified primarily based
on the reluctance of financial institutions to recognize or grant such
rights on their own, interoperability rules are justified by simpler
122. See Eric Dash, Citi Data Theft Points Up a Nagging Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/business/10citi.html
[https://perma.cc/S6QU-XNE6]
(discussing the federal response to a data hack against Citigroup); Telis Demos & Emily Glazer,
Banks Have a Solution for Their Identity-Fraud Woes: The DMV, WALL ST. J., https://
www.wsj.com/articles/banks-have-a-solution-for-their-identity-fraud-woes-the-dmv-1542018600
(last updated Nov. 12, 2018, 4:45 PM ET) [https://perma.cc/K5FJ-EE9V] (describing banks’ efforts
to work with government offices in order to properly screen and ensure that potential new
customers “are who they say they are”).
123. See, e.g., Andy Bounds, Lloyds Bank Swipes Callsign Deal to Bolster Cyber Security,
FIN. TIMES (July 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/02037454-a312-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d
[https://perma.cc/SA52-32WS]; Brian Gaynor, Are You Ready for PSD2 Strong Customer
Authentication?,
GLOB.
BANKING
&
FIN.
REV.
(Dec.
13,
2017),
https://
www.globalbankingandfinance.com/are-you-ready-for-psd2-and-strong-customer-authentication/
[https://perma.cc/2BA8-DFC6].
124. See INFO. SEC. MEDIA GRP., THE FUTURE OF ADAPTIVE AUTHENTICATION IN THE
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY (2019), https://www.onespan.com/sites/default/files/2019-03/OneSpanAnalystReport-ISMG-Future-of-Adaptive-Authentication-in-the-Financial-Industry.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8VPR-NHPA] (arguing that banks do not need to choose between providing a secure
service and providing a service that is convenient for customers).
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coordination-based reasons. Despite the fact that scholars and
policymakers focus much of their attention on large Wall Street banks
of the “too big to fail” type, the banking landscape in the United States
is in fact quite fragmented. There are over five thousand FDIC-insured
banks in the United States. 125 There are another 5,733 NCUA-insured
credit unions.126 And this does not even count other financial firms, such
as insurance companies, online lenders, and payment companies. Thus,
despite the widespread perception that the financial industry is highly
concentrated, in fact there exists a large number of relevant actors.
The fragmentation of financial markets increases the difficulty
of accessing and analyzing data, and thus, increases the barriers to
entry for fintech companies. The cost for a small fintech startup to gain
access to this system—where there are thousands of different banks
that must be taken into account, each with its own website,
authentication procedures, and account design—is high.127 One of the
costs, of course, is simply software: it is hard to design a system for
accessing many different types of websites and to maintain that system
as myriad banks review, update, and change security procedures. This
is more than just a theoretical problem. In 2015, J.P. Morgan and Wells
Fargo changed technical features of their websites in a way that left
Mint customers unable to see their account information through Mint’s
app for several days.128 In 2018, Capital One changed its cybersecurity
procedures for its website in a way that limited one of the biggest data
aggregators, Plaid, from accessing account information.129 As a result,
customers of Venmo, Robinhood, and Acorns all lost the ability
to use those companies’ apps.130 Fintech startups that seek to
provide seamless service to customers must, as a result, spend
tremendous resources and manpower just ensuring that their software
continues working.
Another expense that stems from fragmentation in the market
is negotiation cost.131 Many banks now require fintech companies that
125. See Statistics at a Glance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO. (June 30, 2019), https://www.fdic.gov/
bank/statistical/stats/2019jun/industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/STA2-HVPZ].
126. Baker Shogry, How Many Financial Institutions Are in the U.S.?, PLAID (July 19, 2017),
https://blog.plaid.com/how-many-fis/ [https://perma.cc/V43U-28ZY].
127. See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 15, at 242–44 (discussing
the significant barriers to entry that fintech firms face in the financial industry).
128. Sidel, supra note 111.
129. Surane, supra note 109.
130. Id.
131. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH AND INNOVATION 29 (2018) (“Consumers’ ability
to realize the benefits of data aggregation is limited, in part due to the lack of agreement between
data aggregators and financial services companies over access to consumer financial account and
transaction data.”).
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seek to access their financial data to first sign burdensome data sharing
agreements that set forth the terms on which that access occurs.132
While these agreements have a clear rationale from the perspective of
banks, which seek to limit their exposure to liability from data sharing
as well as conduct due diligence on the identity of the fintech company
accessing their website, they also impose outsized costs on fintech
companies seeking to provide comprehensive services to customers.133
After all, negotiating a single contract with a bank can be costly, but at
least it has a limited time horizon and fixed costs. Negotiating
thousands of such contracts, on the other hand, is beyond the reach of
all but the largest fintech companies.134 Without some sort of
standardized set of terms and conditions of access, the cost of doing
business for most fintech institutions will simply be prohibitive.
Just as importantly, there are strong reasons for financial
institutions not to adopt interoperable standards. 135 As mentioned
before, banks and other financial firms view data sharing as, at best, a
compliance cost and, at worst, a competitive threat. Thus, to the extent
that banks can achieve substantive compliance with the law, but at the
same time erect barriers to growth in the market, they may view such
scenarios as desirable business strategies. The current structure of
varied and inconsistent access protocols and application program
interfaces, which raises costs for fintech companies, thus serves their
interests. As a result, they will have little interest in converging
towards an industry-wide, interoperable standard, which would lower
barriers to entry. Even in the best of cases, where market participants
have a strong interest in consistent standards and interoperable
software, coordination can be difficult. Where they have active interests
in divergence, coordination becomes nearly impossible.
To be sure, some firms are seeking to overcome these difficulties.
One major feature of the data economy today is the growth of data
aggregators, who specialize in gathering business data from a wide
variety of sources and then packaging and reselling it in more userfriendly formats.136 Data aggregators have played an essential role in
132. See, e.g., Crosman, supra note 110 (describing why banks and aggregators make these
agreements that, for example, only allow the aggregators access to bank systems at certain times);
Crosman, supra note 78 (describing Wells Fargo’s data sharing agreement with Plaid).
133. See Crosman, supra note 110; Crosman, supra note 78.
134. See Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, supra note 20 (“The typical fintech firm is small,
leanly staffed, and narrowly focused on one type of service.”).
135. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013) (exploring
the problem of parallel exclusion in which multiple firms engage in conduct that blocks or slows
would-be market entrants).
136. See Brian Hurh, Adam D. Maarec & Chris Chamness, Consumer Financial Data
Aggregation and the Potential for Regulatory Intervention, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 20, 21
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enabling fintech startups to gain greater insight into consumer
financial data.137 Plaid and Finicity, for example, have negotiated
agreements with many of the largest banks for access to their
systems.138 They have been able to take advantage of their larger size
and position as more established market players to gain leverage with
large financial institutions.139 Other fintech companies, in turn, can
work with the data aggregators to gain access to the financial data they
need. Plaid counts among its customers Venmo, Betterment, Acorns,
and Coinbase.140
But data aggregators cannot resolve the basic problem of
fragmentation: until banks have interoperable standards for data
sharing, fintech companies will either have to face the daunting
challenge of finding ways to access thousands of banks’ platforms or,
alternatively, pay third-party middlemen to do it for them. Both of these
options are expensive and burdensome. Neither of them facilitates the
kind of open, transparent data sharing market that is necessary to
increase competition and innovation in the sector.
Thus, in order for a transparent, data-focused financial market
to develop, regulation will need to force convergence and
interoperability on the industry. The basic principle here is simple.
Regulation should encourage financial institutions to develop
interoperable platforms that allow consumers and fintech companies
(2017) (“For roughly two decades, ‘data aggregators’ have sought to collect consumers’ financial
account information from various financial institutions, including transaction, balance, and fee
information relating to credit cards, auto loans, mortgages, and securities.”).
137. See Odinet, supra note 63, at 802 (discussing how online banking, accounting, and other
software create information bundles that help fintech platforms operate efficiently).
138. See Telis Demos, Fintech Firm Plaid Raises $44 Million, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2016,
7:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-firm-plaid-raises-44-million-1466377808 [https://
perma.cc/QYU4-77WL] (discussing how Plaid’s software “allows a variety of financial-technology
startups to access their customers’ bank account information”); John Detrixhe, The Seeds of
Visa’s $5.3 Billion Acquisition of Plaid Were Planted More Than a Year Ago, QUARTZ (Jan. 6,
2020),
https://qz.com/1784765/the-seeds-of-visas-5-3-billion-acquisition-of-plaid-were-plantedmore-than-a-year-ago/ [https://perma.cc/BLL2-82EP] (mentioning Plaid’s agreements with
JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, and PNC); Working Together to Strengthen Data Sharing, FINICITY (Aug.
7, 2020), https://www.finicity.com/td-bank-data-sharing-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/U5UULS5D] (mentioning Finicity’s agreements with Chase, Wells Fargo, Capital One, USAA, Fidelity,
and US Bank); Penny Crosman, The Battle over Bank Customer Data May Finally Be Over, AM.
BANKER (Nov. 6, 2017, 12:17 PM EST), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-battle-overbank-customer-data-may-finally-be-over [https://perma.cc/44KQ-UCFL] (discussing the increase
in use of fintech platforms by large banks, such as Wells Fargo’s use of Finicity).
139. See Wells Fargo and Plaid Sign Data Exchange Agreement, WELLS FARGO (Sept. 19,
2019), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/innovation-and-technology/wells-fargo-and-plaidsign-data-exchange-agreement [https://perma.cc/6PZ9-CTHS] (“We want to be where our
customers are . . . [a]nd if customers want to share their Wells Fargo account information with a
Plaid-supported app to help them better manage their finances, we want to enable them to do
so seamlessly . . . .”).
140. PLAID, https://plaid.com (last visited Dec. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9NTJ-B2Z9].
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access to their financial data in standardized formats and processes.141
If banks change or upgrade their security procedures, they should be
obligated to ensure that these changes do not obstruct data access.142
The terms of access (such as liability allocation, data security
requirements, and consumer consent) should be reasonably uniform
across the industry.143
The devil, of course, is in the details, and precisely what
standards, what platforms, and what terms should be established will
be matters of intense debate. Fintech firms tend to favor open-ended
access that mirrors the data that consumers can see.144 Large
incumbent banks tend to favor more limited access that has clear
liability and tracing requirements.145 Industry groups are starting to
work on some of these problems, attempting to reach consensus on the
terms of data sharing and access. The Financial Data Exchange, for
example, is a consortium of financial services and technology
companies⎯including large institutions like Bank of America, Capital
One, Citi, and Wells Fargo⎯that seeks to create and disseminate data
sharing standards.146 But progress within these groups has been slow—
perhaps because of the lack of incentives for interoperability among the

141. For a general discussion of interoperability and market access, see Alan Devlin, Michael
Jacobs & Bruno Peixoto, Success, Dominance, and Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157 (2009);
Suzanne Van Arsdale & Cody Venzke, Predatory Innovation in Software Markets, 29 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 243 (2015); Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1549 (2009); Stacy A. Baird, Government Role and the Interoperability
Ecosystem, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 219 (2009). But see Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos,
Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy
Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335 (2013) (arguing that while “data portability is appealing,” a new law
requiring it as a right presents concerns for competition laws, privacy, and data protection).
142. See Crosman, supra note 138 (noting that consumers need a secure and transparent way
to control access to their data as they please).
143. See Brad Carr, Pablo Urbiola & Adrien Delle-Case, Liability and Consumer Protection in
Open Banking, INST. INT’L FIN. 6 (2018), https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/private/32370132_
liability_and_consumer_protection_in_open_banking_091818.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DJQ-QMJ6]
(recommending a formal consumer protection framework for open banking systems addressing
security, customer problems, and liability).
144. See Daniel Döderlein, Fintechs’ Defense of Screen Scraping Is Shortsighted, AM. BANKER
(Sept. 7, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fintechs-defense-of-screenscraping-is-shortsighted [https://perma.cc/R2HH-YBAU] (noting that fintech firms prefer screen
scraping because it provides access to the same information that consumers have, whereas banks’
APIs provide only limited information).
145. Id.
146. See FIN. DATA EXCH., https://financialdataexchange.org/FDX/About/FDX/About/About.as
px (last visited Dec. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9VJA-9PEF] (“The Financial Data Exchange (FDX)
is a nonprofit organization that is dedicated to unifying the financial industry around a common,
interoperable and royalty-free standard for the secure access of user permissioned financial
data.”); Members, FIN. DATA EXCH., https://financialdataexchange.org/FDX/The%20Consortium/
FDX/The-Consortium/Members.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3CCL-N4KD]
(listing Bank of America, Capital One, Citi, and Wells Fargo as members).
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largest players.147 Regulation could speed up the development and
adoption of the kinds of standards that the industry needs.148
Ultimately, however, precisely what standard becomes the
industry rule is less important than the fact that there is a standard in
the first place.149 As mentioned before, fragmentation in the market
creates a high barrier to entry for fintech firms seeking to provide
services to consumers. The lack of uniformity in data access and sharing
standards has meant that fintech firms must spend extensive time and
resources on ensuring their programs work across the wide variety of
banks and financial institutions from which they draw data. The
creation of a uniform interface or software standard could
simultaneously reduce transaction costs and provide financial
institutions with greater certainty about the liability risks and contract
terms of data sharing.
D. Security
Finally, data-oriented financial regulation must also ensure that
financial data sharing occurs in a secure and protected fashion. Just as
it is important to ensure that consumers own their financial data and
can access and share it in reasonably convenient formats, it is also
important to establish legal frameworks governing the respective
obligations of parties that possess or receive that data. As the financial
industry becomes more open and transparent to third-party fintech
companies that filter, aggregate, and analyze individual data, it is
essential that these changes do not undermine the systems in place to
protect financial data from hacking or unauthorized disclosure.
Of course, simply saying that financial institutions must protect
data from cybertheft does not ensure that they will, or even that they
can. Recent years have witnessed an explosion of large-scale and
damaging data breaches that exposed the personal information of
billions of people.150 These hacks have affected some of the largest
147. See Ron Shevlin, Why Open Banking Won’t Work in the US, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronshevlin/2019/04/15/open-banking-wont-work-in-us/ [https://
perma.cc/P8MK-US67] (noting that previous attempts by big banks to integrate fintech took many
years and required outside assistance).
148. Similar regulations have been proposed in the healthcare industry. See HHS Proposes
New Rules to Improve the Interoperability of Electronic Health Information, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/02/11/hhs-proposes-newrules-improve-interoperability-electronic-health-information.html [https://perma.cc/MZC7-RTJ5].
149. See William Magnuson, The Race to the Middle, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2020)
(discussing how a standard regulation produces interoperability effects, allowing systems to
“interact seamlessly” due to lack of conflicting processes).
150. A study by the Identity Theft Resource Center identified 1,244 data breaches in 2018.
These breaches led to the exposure of 446 million records. The financial sector alone accounted for
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companies in the world.151 Some researchers have found troubling flaws
in the cybersecurity procedures of fintech companies.152 And precisely
how law can effect change in cybersecurity, if it can at all, is a matter
of substantial uncertainty.153 Two basic principles of cybersecurity law
can, however, provide incentives for companies to adopt best practices
in data protection, even if they cannot provide perfect compliance.
One important feature of data sharing is traceability. The idea
behind traceability is to ensure that data is tracked as it moves from
one party to another.154 Traceability is essential in securing data and
preventing data from being used for unauthorized purposes. 155 It also
allows consumers to see where their data is going and how it is being
used.156 Existing technologies provide support for at least some measure
135 breaches and 1.7 million records exposed. I DENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA
BREACH REPORT 9 (2019), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018End-of-Year-Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACN6-PACD].
151. Among the companies that suffered data breaches were Google, Facebook, T-Mobile, and
British Airways. See Saima Salim, Revealed: The 21 Biggest Data Breaches of 2018, DIGIT. INFO.
WORLD (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2018/12/biggest-data-breachesof-2018.html [https://perma.cc/L2ZT-4ZGP].
152. See Steve O’Hear, Monzo Says It Wasn’t Storing ‘Some’ Customer PINs Correctly, but Has
Now Fixed the Bug, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 5, 2019, 7:45 AM CDT), https://techcrunch.com/2019/
08/05/monzo-says-it-wasnt-storing-some-customer-pins-correctly-but-has-now-fixed-the-bug/
[https://perma.cc/JLZ2-EN79]; Vincent Haupert, Dominik Maier & Tilo Müller, Paying the Price
for Disruption: How a FinTech Allowed Account Takeover, ROOTS, Nov. 2017, at 1, 1 (arguing
that fintech companies’ focus on user experience and modern design has come at the expense
of security).
153. The literature on the topic is vast and varied. See generally, e.g., Brian B. Kelly, Note,
Investing in a Centralized Cybersecurity Infrastructure: Why “Hacktivism” Can and Should
Influence Cybersecurity Reform, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1663 (2012); Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof,
Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The Law of CyberAttack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817 (2012); Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data
Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation
Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373 (2014); Benjamin P. Edwards, Cybersecurity
Oversight Liability, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663 (2019); Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod,
Corporate Directors’ and Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM.
U. L. REV. 1231 (2017); Benjamin Dynkin & Barry Dynkin, Derivative Liability in the Wake of a
Cyber Attack, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 23 (2018); Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law:
Creating a Consistent and Incentive-Based System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401 (2016); Scott J.
Shackelford & Austin E. Brady, Is It Time for a National Cybersecurity Safety Board? Examining
the Policy Implications and Political Pushback, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 56 (2018).
154. See OPEN DATA INST. & FINGLETON, OPEN BANKING IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY, O PEN
BANKING, PREPARING FOR LIFT OFF 37 (2019), https://www.openbanking.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/open-banking-report-150719.pdf [https://perma.cc/P52D-CJTT] (discussing open
banking mechanisms that rely on tracking information, such as data deletion practices upon
revocation of consumer consent); The Global Industry Standard for Consumer Access to Financial
Data: Organizational Overview, FIN. DATA EXCH. 7 (2019), https://financialdataexchange.org/
common/Uploaded%20files/10.3_FDX_WhitePaper_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9E3C-TTYK]
(discussing traceability as a core principle and stating that “data users should know each step the
data takes”).
155. See FIN. DATA EXCH., supra note 154, at 7 (noting that traceability may “result in faster
detection and response to potential errors and suspicious traffic”).
156. Id.
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of traceability in financial data.157 Companies can, for example, include
user consent information in the metadata that is associated with
transaction data.158 This allows governments and market participants
to observe an audit trail and confirm that regulatory requirements are
being met.159
Another important prong of cybersecurity within the data
sharing industry is liability. The stakes here are large. One study found
that the average cost of a data breach in the financial industry was
approximately $5.9 million.160 The cost per record lost was $210.161
Among participants in the study, the probability of a data breach in the
next two years was estimated at 29.6 percent.162 In other words, the
likelihood of a data breach is high, and the damage from that breach is
large. As a result, determining who is liable for data breaches and theft
is essential. Currently, however, this determination is ambiguous—
there is no overarching rule on when data sharing participants are
liable for data breaches or how responsibility is partitioned.163 Instead,
market participants must reach agreement on how liability works
through private negotiation. This in turn introduces new pathologies,
as larger market players with greater leverage can impose burdensome
rules on smaller players, with the threat of market exclusion backing

157. See OPEN DATA INST. & FINGLETON, supra note 154, at 37 (discussing “codifying consent,”
which involves “attaching [users’] codified intent to [each] transaction data as metadata” so the
consent information goes wherever the data goes).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See IBM SECURITY, COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT 2019, at 26 (2019),
https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/ZBZLY7KL [https://perma.cc/PR3C-UEN5] (showing average
total costs of data breaches by industry, with the financial industry’s average cost at $5.86 million).
161. Id. at 27.
162. Id. at 10.
163. The Congressional Research Service describes the state of data protection law in the
following stark terms:
Despite the increased interest in data protection, the legal paradigms governing the
security and privacy of personal data are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at
the federal level. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution provides
various rights protecting individual privacy, but these rights generally guard only
against government intrusions and do little to prevent private actors from abusing
personal data online. At the federal statutory level, while there are a number of data
protection statutes, they primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of
data. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fills in some of the statutory gaps by
enforcing the federal prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices.
But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of
personal data.
STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, WILSON C. FREEMAN & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631,
DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2019) (citations omitted).
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their demands. And consumers seeking to be made whole for their
losses face the prospect of expensive and time-consuming litigation.164
Instead, data-oriented financial regulation must provide clear
rules about who is liable in the event of a data breach or theft. Several
possible structures for determining liability exist, not all of them
mutually exclusive.165 First, one could establish a rule that the breached
party is responsible for any losses that result from the breach. Such a
rule would have the advantage of increasing incentives for financial
institutions to maintain effective cybersecurity procedures, but perhaps
the disadvantage of requiring difficult determinations of where
breaches occurred. Alternatively, one could establish a rule that the
primary financial institution (who will typically be the bank) must
compensate the consumer for losses, with the provision that the
financial institution can seek reimbursement from the breached party
if the breached party has been negligent in protecting or storing data.
This rule would have the advantage of providing a speedy remedy for
consumers, but the disadvantage of placing a disproportionate burden
on banks. Finally, one could establish an industry-wide insurance fund
that would be used to compensate consumers for loss, with the fund
being financed by all market participants. Again, this rule has
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it would provide
prompt compensation to consumers and force market participants to
bear the cost of data risks. On the other, it would involve substantial
complexity in determining who would participate in funding the
insurance fund and add yet another layer of government oversight.
To be sure, data sharing liability is not unregulated under
current law. The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Safeguards Rule
requires financial institutions to take reasonable steps to keep
consumer data secure.166 The SEC’s rules require investment

164. In 2018, a group of industry participants issued a proposed “Secure Open Data Access”
framework addressing these problems. It proposed that financial institutions retain responsibility
for financial losses stemming from data breaches for which they are responsible and that data
aggregators ensure that third party customers have the capacity to make consumers whole for any
losses that result from a breach at a third party. See Ron Barasch, Statement of Joint Principles
for Ensuring Consumer Access to Financial Data, ENVESTNET YODLEE (May 11, 2018),
https://www.yodlee.com/financial-data/envestnet-yodlee-quovo-and-morningstar-byallaccountsstatement-of-joint-principles-for-ensuring-consumer-access-to-financial-data
[https://perma.cc/
2XG2-UVDU].
165. For a summary of some of these structures and how they work in practice, see Carr et al.,
supra note 143, at 4–5.
166. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 647 (2014) (noting that the Safeguards Rule requires financial
institutions to develop comprehensive information-security programs to protect consumer data);
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn
of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 258–59 (2007) (discussing the Comprehensive
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intermediaries to protect customer records and information.167 These
rules impose liability on financial institutions if they fail to keep
consumer data secure.
The problem, though, is that there is an inherent tension
between data sharing and data liability. If a financial institution is
responsible for any losses stemming from cyberthefts or breaches, it will
be less likely to share data with others, who might lose it or fail to
safeguard it. The more a financial institution opens its systems to third
parties, the higher the chance that data breaches will occur. Thus, given
the substantial compliance burdens on banks today, it is
understandable that they would be hesitant to grant unfettered access
to consumer data, even if the consumer consents to the sharing.
But there are ways to reduce these tensions. Clear rules about
where liability lies within data sharing transactions are a start. 168 So
are rules that exculpate financial institutions if they demonstrate that
they have adopted reasonable cybersecurity procedures.169 The
availability of a ready reserve of insurance funds to pay consumer
claims could also reduce risk to financial institutions from cyberintrusions.170 The problem of attribution is a difficult one, but it is not
insurmountable.171 Thus, financial regulation must aim to pair data
sharing with enhanced data security.
E. Lessons from Abroad
This Part has argued that financial regulation must adjust in
order to encourage the kinds of beneficial innovation in finance that
technology has now made possible. It has proposed a number of
Identity Theft Protection Act, which provides standards parallel to the FTC’s and requires
financial institutions to design information-security programs to suit the data they store).
167. See Gregg Moran, Comment, The SEC’s Data Dilemma: Addressing a Modern Problem by
Encouraging Innovation, Responsibility, and Fairness, 96 NEB. L. REV. 446, 457 (2017) (explaining
that the SEC’s Safeguards Rule requires investment intermediaries to adopt written policies and
procedures for protecting customer data).
168. See Edwards, supra note 153, at 676–77 (arguing that although courts typically hesitate
before imposing liability for cybersecurity failure, they should impose liability where companies
fail to protect against known risk).
169. See ASHURST, supra note 24 (discussing liability allocation between banks, fintech firms,
and customers under Europe’s regulation on exploiting and sharing data).
170. See DELOITTE, CREATING AN OPEN BANKING FRAMEWORK FOR CANADA: CONSIDERATIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS OF KEY DESIGN CHOICES 45 (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/ca/Documents/financial-services/ca-open-banking-aoda-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9G5F8LBC] (arguing that Canada should require a “mandatory insurance product . . . that pays out in
case of disruptive losses that lead to complete failure of a data recipient” in operating their open
banking system).
171. See Carr et al., supra note 143, at 4–5 (discussing options for dividing risk between banks
and third parties and arguing that making all participants “directly and explicitly” responsible for
failures is the best way to protect data).
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important regulatory changes, including establishing a right of
ownership in financial data, a right to share that data with others, and
an obligation on financial institutions to create interoperable and
secure data systems. Needless to say, these proposals would require
substantial adjustments to the regulatory framework of the financial
industry. Fortunately for policymakers in the United States, however,
other jurisdictions around the world have already started acting on
precisely these questions. From Europe to Asia, countries are taking
steps to open up their financial systems to more fulsome and
transparent data sharing. Indeed, much of the policy experimentation
in banking today occurs outside of the United States.172 Thus, the
United States does not have to legislate in a vacuum. Instead, it can
learn from the lessons of other countries that have enacted financial
data sharing laws. This subpart will take a look at a few regulations,
from the U.K., the E.U., and Australia, to show just how varied the
landscape is.
1. European Union
Much like the United States, Europe has long had a fragmented
financial industry.173 The E.U. has twenty-eight member states, each
with its own financial and banking rules and regulators, making it
difficult and costly for financial firms to operate across borders.174
Cognizant of this problem, the E.U. has passed several directives
aimed at creating a “single market” for financial services across
the continent.175
These efforts began in 2007 with a rule known as the Payment
Service Directive.176 The Payment Service Directive aimed to
harmonize and simplify rules governing how financial payments were
made in the E.U.177 To do so, it created an authorization and
172. See Tech’s Raid on the Banks: Digital Disruption Is Coming to Banking at Last,
ECONOMIST (May 2, 2019), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/05/02/techs-raid-on-thebanks [https://perma.cc/JP98-X7XN] (noting that many new banking technologies originate
outside the U.S.).
173. See Niamh Moloney, ‘Bending to Uniformity’: EU Financial Regulation with and Without
the UK, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1335, 1339–59 (2017) (discussing the history of financial regulation
in the E.U., particularly in light of the United Kingdom’s influence on such regulation).
174. See Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez, Supervisory Cooperation in the Single Market for Financial
Services: United in Diversity?, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 589, 612 (2018) (“Nationally based
supervisory models have lagged behind the integrated and interconnected reality of today’s
European financial markets, in which many financial firms operate across borders.”).
175. Id. at 640–42.
176. For a history of the development of the Payment Services Directive, see Agnieszka
Janczuk, Legislative Update, The Single Payments Area in Europe, 16 COLUM. J. E UR. L.
321 (2010).
177. Id. at 326–32.
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supervisory regime for payment institutions, it set forth disclosure
requirements for institutions offering services to consumers, and it
established a uniform set of rights and obligations for payment
providers and users.178
Although the Payment Service Directive provided consumers
with more uniform rights with regard to their payment providers and
established more expansive disclosures to consumers about the terms
of their accounts, it was widely seen as not going far enough.179 In
particular, many observers noted that it failed to give fintech companies
adequate access to the consumer data they needed.180 In response to
these criticisms, the E.U. Council passed a Revised Directive on
Payment Services, widely known as “PSD2,” in 2015.181 PSD2 aimed to
go further than the initial Payment Services Directive in opening
up banks to data sharing arrangements and competition from
fintech firms.
Three important features of PSD2 are relevant for our purposes.
First, it requires payment providers to grant access to consumer
accounts to third-party providers for account information aggregation
services.182 Second, it requires payment providers to use “strong
customer authentication” to ensure that any time a consumer accesses
his account or initiates transactions, payment processors confirm that
he consented to the transaction.183 And third, it sets forth rules aimed
at speeding up the time in which customer complaints are resolved and
clarifying how liability will be allocated.184

178. Id.
179. See Alan Brener, Payment Service Directive II and Its Implications, in DISRUPTING
FINANCE: FINTECH AND STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 103, 106–08 (Theo Lynn, John G. Mooney,
Pierangelo Rosati & Mark Cummins eds., 2019) (arguing that the original Payment Service
Directive aided efficiency in a number of ways but still had significant failures).
180. See DATASTAX, PREPARING FOR PSD2: THE ROLE FOR DATA AND THE FUTURE FOR BANKING
4 (2017), https://www.fintechfutures.com/files/2017/04/Whitepaper-Datastax-EMEA-PSD2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7KR-VWN6] (arguing that old banking systems should be reengineered to
provide more streamlined access to consumer data).
181. Council Directive, 2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337/35). For a summary of PSD2’s key
requirements, see Douglas W. Arner, Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Rolf H. Weber, The
Future of Data-Driven Finance and RegTech: Lessons from EU Big Bang II, 25 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 245 (2020).
182. See Giuseppe Colangelo & Oscar Borgogno, Data, Innovation and Transatlantic
Competition in Finance: The Case of the Access to Account Rule, 31 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 573 (2020)
(describing the access-to-account rule, which requires banks and other payment providers to
provide third-party aggregators access to consumer data on a non-discriminatory basis).
183. See Delayed Implementation of Strong Customer Authentication, BAKER MCKENZIE 1
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2019/09/
delayed-implementation-of-strong-customer-authentication.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HHM-CYED].
184. See The Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2): What You Need to Know, ERNST
& YOUNG (2018), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/banking-and-
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In some ways, these features of PSD2 represent an aggressive
effort to force change in the market. They require payment providers to
provide account access to a wide range of fintech companies for two
main purposes: to analyze the consumer’s financial data and to operate
the account by initiating payments.185 This requirement marks a
significant change from the status quo before the passage of the
regulation, when few third-party fintech companies could initiate
payments through their apps.186 PSD2 also forced banks to significantly
bolster their customer authentication procedures. Article 97 requires
banks to apply “strong customer authentication” any time a consumer
accesses his payment account online, initiates a payment, or “carries
out any action through a remote channel which may imply a risk of
payment fraud or other abuses.”187 “Strong customer authentication,”
in turn, is defined generally as two-factor authentication⎯that is, a
method that requires two different types of information, such as both a
password and access to a phone. 188 Again, prior to the passage of the
directive, many financial institutions did not use two-factor
authentication for bank accounts. Thus, in some ways, the E.U. has
forced significant changes on the way that financial institutions
do business.
At the same time, the E.U. has adopted a surprisingly
permissive and limited regulatory stance in many other aspects of
PSD2. For one, and perhaps most importantly, PSD2 only applies to
payment accounts.189 This is perhaps an obvious point, given that the
name of the directive is the Payment Services Directive, but it has
capital-markets/bcm-pdf/ey-regulatory-agenda-updates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UKB9-HP8T]
(describing PSD2’s rules governing the resolution of customer complaints).
185. See Council Directive, 2015/2366, supra note 181, arts. 66-67 (requiring payment
initiation service providers to communicate with account servicing payment service providers
immediately after transactions to share all available data).
186. Alessandro Longoni, PSD2 - What Changes?, FINEXTRA (May 30, 2016),
https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/12668/psd2-what-changes [https://perma.cc/LLU8-E3F8].
187. Council Directive, 2015/2366, supra note 181, art. 97(1).
188. Article 4(30) defines “strong customer authentication” as
an authentication based on the use of two or more elements categorised as knowledge
(something only the user knows), possession (something only the user possesses) and
inherence (something the user is) that are independent, in that the breach of one does
not compromise the reliability of the others, and is designed in such a way as to protect
the confidentiality of the authentication data.
Id. art. 4(30).
189. See, e.g., id. art. 36 (“Member States shall ensure that payment institutions have access
to credit institutions’ payment accounts services on an objective, non-discriminatory and
proportionate basis.”); id. art. 67(3) (“In relation to payment accounts, the account servicing
payment service provider shall: (a) communicate securely with the account information service
providers . . . and (b) treat data requests transmitted through the services of an account
information service provider without any discrimination for other than objective reasons.”).
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surprisingly profound and, in some ways, perverse effects on the
regulation’s scope. All of PSD2’s obligations (related to consumer rights,
access to data, and strong customer authentication) only apply to a very
specific and limited set of accounts.190 They apply to checking accounts,
but not savings accounts.191 They apply to current accounts, but not
retirement accounts.192 They apply to some credit card accounts, but not
others.193 This narrow application for data sharing has been widely
criticized as insufficient to enable the competition and innovation that
proponents originally hoped for.194
PSD2 has also been criticized for failing to provide uniform
standards for data sharing.195 While the regulation requires financial
institutions to share consumer data with fintech companies, it does not
specify the form in which such sharing must occur.196 As a result,
financial institutions have devised their own proprietary platforms for

190. PSD2 applies to “payment accounts,” which it defines broadly as “account[s] held in the
name of one or more payment service users which [are] used for the execution of payment
transactions.” Id. art. 4(12). But courts have interpreted the term quite narrowly, such that it only
includes accounts that can be used to pay third parties without the intervention of intermediate
steps. See Michael McKee, James Barnard, Georgia Karamani & Marina Troullinou, ECJ Ruling
on Interpretation of Payment Account Under PSD2, DLA PIPER (Oct. 8, 2018), https://
www.dlapiperintelligence.com/investmentrules/blog/articles/2018/ecj-ruling-on-interpretation-ofpayment-account-under-psd2.html [https://perma.cc/G59S-64KL] (discussing the ECJ’s finding
that a defining characteristic of “payment accounts” is the ability to directly execute payment
transactions without an intermediary account).
191. McKee et al., supra note 190.
192. See Frequently Asked Questions: Making Electronic Payments and Online Banking Safer
and Easier for Consumers, EUR. COMM’N (Sept. 13, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_5555 [https://perma.cc/Y7Y6-GANZ] (clarifying that current
accounts are covered by PSD2 because they are accounts “where the holder can place and withdraw
funds” without any intervention by a payment service provider).
193. See Response to EBA Consultation on RTS for SCA, ASS’N OF CREDIT CARD ISSUERS
EUR., http://www.accie.eu/pdf/ACCIE%20response%20to%20EBA%20consultation%20on%20RTS
%20SCA_October%202016.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4SHT-7DYG] (calling
for greater clarification of which credit card accounts are covered by PSD2).
194. See Carlos Torres Villa, We Should Extend EU Bank Data Sharing to All Sectors,
FIN. TIMES (June 3, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/0304b078-82c6-11e9-a7f0-77d3101896ec
[https://perma.cc/5XD5-9HCH] (advocating for an expansion of these regulations into other sectors
to push data-driven decisions into those sectors of the economy).
195. See Shahrokh Moinian, Open Banking Can Benefit from Standardized APIs, PAYTHINK:
PAYMENTSSOURCE (Jan. 7, 2019, 12:01 AM EST), https://www.paymentssource.com/opinion/psd2and-open-banking-need-standards-for-apis [https://perma.cc/X665-4H9G]; Saira Guthrie, PSD2
Deadline 14 March: Questions You Should Be Asking Yourself, PING IDENTITY (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.pingidentity.com/en/company/blog/posts/2019/psd2-deadline-march-2019-apiinterface.html [https://perma.cc/GGY2-C2GB] (“The most common critique of PSD2 is that it forces
banks to provide open APIs, but it doesn’t specify a standard format for APIs across the EU.”).
196. Council Directive, 2015/2366, supra note 181, art. 67(1) (“Member States shall ensure
that a payment service user has the right to make use of services enabling access to account
information as referred to in point (8) of Annex I [which refers to ‘account information services’].”).
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data sharing, without a focus on interoperability or harmonization.197
Indeed, some software companies that develop these platforms for
banks market their software as providing a “competitive advantage.”198
Fintech firms have thus struggled to gain access to consumer data in
reasonable forms and on convenient terms.199 Industry groups have
emerged to push for more standardized data sharing platforms, but the
groups themselves are so numerous that they have failed to develop a
single widely recognized standard.200
Ironically, PSD2’s combination of deep but narrow data sharing
obligations may well lead to less access to data than existed before
passage of the regulation. The balance that PSD2 struck, after all, was
to open up banks’ data to fintech companies but to pair that increased
access with increased data security⎯what it referred to as strong
customer authentication.201 Both of these requirements legally only
applied to payments accounts, a very narrow slice of the financial
market.202 But whereas it was easy to limit fintech companies’ access to

197. Here, for example, is how one fintech company described its experience in attempting to
gain access to the various bank APIs it required:
Many access procedures add weeks if not months to an already tight timeline. Some
have an online registration form, but nothing happens once you submit. Others take
weeks to inform us they’re still processing our request or need more information. And
some require notarised copies of our licenses—a big surprise because we’ve been trying
to access dummy data for testing, not real customer data for production (yet). The worst
offenders have rejected us on the basis that we are a foreign third party that did not
use a local provider (QTSP) for our eIDAS certificate. . . . Most of the documentation
we’ve gotten access to is pretty awful, some lacking even the basic description of the
available APIs and responses. A significant number of banks in southern Europe do not
have English-language documentation, and even when a bank uses its native language,
the documentation is often incomplete.
The Sobering September Preview: Banks’ PSD2 APIs Far From Ready, TINK (June 14, 2019),
https://tink.com/blog/2019/06/14/psd2-updated-sandbox [https://perma.cc/ECA5-3ZUW].
198. See Red Hat Verticals Team, Open Banking — How to Leverage Open APIs for Competitive
Advantage in Financial Services, REDHAT (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/openbanking-%E2%80%94-how-leverage-open-apis-competitive-advantage-financial-services
[https://perma.cc/VKC2-XZSL] (explaining how APIs can provide competitive advantages by
fostering creativity, increasing brand awareness, and creating new revenue models).
199. See TINK, supra note 197 (providing negative feedback on the preparedness of banks’ APIs
after testing over one hundred of them).
200. Efforts include OpenID’s Financial-Grade API specification, the U.K.’s Open Banking
Implementation Entity standard, the Berlin Group’s NextGenPSD2 Framework, Financial Data
Exchange’s Durable Data API standard, STET’s PSD2 API, and the PolishAPI Standard. Guthrie,
supra note 195.
201. See Access vs. Security: Takeaways for U.S. Financial Institutions from the European
PSD2 Open API Framework, DYKEMA: THE FIREWALL (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.thefirewallblog.com/2018/08/access-vs-security-takeaways-u-s-financial-institutions-european-psd2-openapi-framework/ [https://perma.cc/NC4K-ETPE] (discussing tradeoffs of PSD2 for fintech
companies and banks).
202. See Council Directive, 2015/2366, supra note 181, art. 36 (ensuring that payment
institutions have access to credit institutions’ payment accounts services).
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just payment-related financial data⎯it simply required an application
program interface related to that data, and not other data⎯it was not
so easy to limit strong customer authentication in this way. Customers
would naturally be confused if the log-in process for their savings
account only worked for their savings account at a bank, but not for
their checking account, and vice versa. Instead, banks tended to adopt
increased data security procedures for all customer accounts.203 These
increased data procedures, in turn, made it more difficult for fintech
companies to access financial data, at least if it was not payment
related. Indeed, one common fintech technique, known as screen
scraping, is widely believed to be prohibited under PSD2 regulations.204
The result is a bifurcated system: better access to payment data, but
worse access to everything else. This is surely a perverse result.
2. United Kingdom
In August 2016, after a longstanding investigation into the state
of competition in the banking market, the U.K.’s Competition and
Markets Authority (“CMA”) published a scathing report about the
consumer banking industry. Among the more striking findings was the
fact that only three percent of personal customers switched to new
banks in any year, a shockingly low turnover rate.205 The report
ultimately concluded that “older and larger banks . . . do not have to
work hard enough to win and retain customers” and that “it is difficult
for new and smaller providers to attract customers.”206 In order to
remedy this problem, the CMA issued a comprehensive set of new rules
aimed at improving competition and choice in the financial industry.

203. See Edward Corcoran, PSD2 and Strong Customer Authentication: New Rules Set to
Change How Bank Customers’ Identity Is Checked, BBVA (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.bbva.com/en/opinion/psd2-and-strong-customer-authentication-new-rules-set-tochange-how-bank-customers-identity-is-checked/ [https://perma.cc/8NDH-W4CY] (discussing how
the authentication requirements will likely make user experiences with banking more complex).
204. There is some debate about the proper interpretation of PSD2’s implementing guidelines.
Some believe that screen scraping is banned entirely. See PSD2: ‘Screen Scraping’ Ban
Confirmed in Finalised Standards, PINSENT MASONS: O UT-LAW (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/psd2-screen-scraping-ban-confirmed-in-finalisedstandards [https://perma.cc/6E97-LNSU]. Others believe it is simply prohibited without proper
identification by the fintech firm using it. See Arturo González Mac Dowell, Screen Scraping Is
Dead, Long Live Screen Scraping, FINEXTRA (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.finextra.com/
blogposting/14793/screen-scraping-is-dead-long-live-screen-scraping
[https://perma.cc/Q5W8Q5MC] (providing resources and explanations for determining when screen scraping is allowed).
205. Making Banks Work Harder for You, COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH. 1 (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/544942/overview-of-the-banking-retail-market.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RNR-ZDVB].
206. Id.
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Among these was a set of “Open Banking” rules focused specifically on
financial data.207
The Open Banking rules created broad obligations on the U.K.’s
nine largest banks to share consumer data in a secure and standardized
format and share it with third parties as requested by consumers. 208
The financial data that is covered by the rules ranged from such basic
information as branch and ATM locations to more detailed information
such as transaction data and product prices.209 The CMA did not itself
set the specific standards under which data sharing would occur,
however. Instead, it set up a special purpose entity, the Open Banking
Implementation Entity, for this task. 210 The implementation entity is
itself a private organization, but it is funded by the nine largest U.K.
banks and overseen by the CMA, the Financial Conduct Authority, and
the Treasury.211 The implementation entity has since issued detailed
technical standards on how banks must handle financial data
sharing.212 It has also been remarkably responsive to consumer
feedback. After complaints that the initial standards issued by the
entity were overly cumbersome, the entity revised the standards to
simplify the consumer experience.213 The implementation entity is also
tasked with managing the process for handling disputes and complaints
related to open banking.214 Importantly, however, not every fintech
company can gain access to the newly open and transparent financial
data ecosystem. Instead, in order to access the open banking system,

207. Id. at 7–11.
208. Other banks could opt into the arrangement, but were not obligated to do so. See The
Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017, COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., at art. 12 (2017),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5893063bed915d06e1000000/retail-bankingmarket-investigation-order-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUR9-HB5M] (listing information and data
that “provider” banks, as defined in the order, must make available); Sebastian Anthony, Which
Banks Support Open Banking Today?, BANKRATE, https://www.bankrate.com/uk/open-banking/
which-banks-support-open-banking-today (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LWP3HJRT] (listing “challenger banks” that have voluntarily taken on open banking requirements).
209. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 208, art. 12–14.
210. Id. art. 10.
211. The funding banks are HSBC, Barclays, RBS, Santander, Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish
Bank, Danske, Lloyds, and Nationwide. Rowland Manthorpe, What Is Open Banking and PSD2?,
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/open-banking-cma-psd2-explained [https://
perma.cc/97QP-P77K].
212. See Open Banking: Guidelines for Open Data Participants, OPEN BANKING
IMPLEMENTATION
ENTITY
(2018),
https://www.openbanking.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/
Guidelines-for-Open-Data-Participants.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XAJ-9DW6].
213. See Ana Badour, Domenic Presta & Arie van Wijngaarden, UK Open Banking
Implementation Entity Report Released, MCCARTHY TETRAULT (July 26, 2019),
https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/snipits/uk-open-banking-implementation-entityreport-released [https://perma.cc/TX2R-XVPT].
214. OPEN BANKING IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY, supra note 212, § 7.
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startups must first be approved by the Financial Conduct Authority.215
The Financial Conduct Authority, thus, plays a gatekeeping role
in accrediting and regulating third-party providers in the open
banking industry.216
It is surely too early to tell how open banking rules in the U.K.
will ultimately change the consumer banking market. Rules continue
to be issued and revised, and banks are still working on updating their
platforms.217 There are signs, however, that the rules have introduced
more competition into the financial market. As of November 2019, more
than 150 companies had enrolled in the open banking framework and
been approved by the Financial Conduct Authority.218 The companies
range from large institutions, such as American Express and Barclays,
to innovative startups, such as Revolut and Starling.219 The accounting
firm PwC issued a report that estimated that more than thirty-three
million people would sign up for open banking services by 2022.220
At the same time, there are reasons for caution. Some observers
have noted that banks’ open banking platforms are remarkably
unreliable.221 In April 2019, the CMA reprimanded several banks for
failing to meet their mobile app functionality requirements.222 And
consumers have little awareness of the new efforts to facilitate data
sharing: one survey found that only one in four people had heard of open
banking and that, of those who had heard of it, only one in five knew
what it meant.223

215. See Manthorpe, supra note 211 (“Only startups that have been approved by the Financial
Services Authority [now known as the Financial Conduct Authority] will be allowed to use
the system.”).
216. See id.
217. See CMA Issues Directions to 5 Banks, OPEN BANKING IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY (Apr. 1,
2019),
https://www.openbanking.org.uk/about-us/latest-news/cma-issues-directions-to-5-banks/
[https://perma.cc/QNX6-K86R] (reporting that the CMA issued new directions to five banks not
meeting Open Banking deadlines).
218. See Meet the Regulated Providers, OPEN BANKING IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY,
https://www.openbanking.org.uk/customers/regulated-providers/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/5PWF-ENDJ] (listing each currently regulated provider).
219. Id.
220. Lucy Warwick-Ching, Open Banking: The Quiet Digital Revolution One Year On, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/a5f0af78-133e-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e [https://
perma.cc/9QQG-G3X7].
221. See Is Open Banking Being Hobbled by Outages?, FINEXTRA (May 23, 2019),
https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/33870/is-open-banking-being-hobbled-by-outages [https://
perma.cc/MJ3W-7AQU].
222. Peter Walker, CMA Reprimands Banks over Open Banking Delays, FSTECH (Apr. 9,
2019), https://www.fstech.co.uk/fst/CMA_Reprimands_Banks_Over_Open_Banking_App_Delays.
php [https://perma.cc/KNV9-TM89].
223. See Warwick-Ching, supra note 220.
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3. Australia
In 2017, the Australian government began a multiyear effort to
reform its laws on data governance, with a particular focus on the
treatment of consumer data. In connection with this effort, Prime
Minister Turnbull announced that the government would be
introducing “Consumer Data Right” legislation across sectors to ensure
the “very simple idea that the customer should own their own data.”224
As part of this effort, the government commissioned a report on the
state of the banking sector and how a consumer data right might be
implemented.225 The resulting report concluded that aggressive new
regulation would be required in the sector in order to stimulate
innovation and competition, noting that “given the competitive
advantages afforded to large incumbent firms by limiting the ability of
customers to share their data with third parties, [private sector]
initiatives alone seem unlikely to lead to a widespread increase in data
sharing across the banking sector.”226 After a period of consultation, the
Australian government eventually enacted the Consumer Data Right
Bill into law in 2019.227
Australia’s open banking rules are both broad and deep. They
apply to a wide array of consumer data, including product data,
customer data, account data, and transaction data.228 They also apply
to a broad array of accounts, including credit and debit cards, deposit
accounts, transaction accounts, and loans.229 And finally, they apply to
a broad array of financial institutions—all deposit-taking institutions
are obliged to comply with the open banking rules.230 In connection with
these efforts, the Australian government has created a new “Data

224. Media Release, Assistant Minister for Cities and Digital Transformation, The Hon. Angus
Taylor MP, Australians to Own Their Own Banking, Energy, Phone and Internet Data (Nov. 26,
2017), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/5656429/upload_binary/5656
429.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22media/pressrel/5656429%22 [https://perma.cc/
JA9P-3BRB].
225. Open Banking: Customers, Choice, Convenience, Confidence, AUSTL. GOV’T, at vii (2017),
https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/Review-into-Open-Banking-_For-web-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CSE5-FZTG].
226. Id. at 4.
227. Robyn Chatwood & Ben Allen, Australian Government Passes Consumer Data Right
Legislation on 1 August 2019, DENTONS (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/
alerts/2019/august/8/australian-government-passes-consumer-data-right-legislation-on-1-august2019 [https://perma.cc/2YXJ-YJPJ].
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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Standards Body,” with authority to establish the technical standards
for data sharing within the industry.231
At the same time, in order to prevent a chaotic transition in the
industry, Australia has created a series of stages in which progressively
more burdensome requirements come into force. In the first stage,
which began in January 2020, Australia’s four largest
banks⎯Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the National Australia
Bank, the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, and Westpac
(the “Big Four”)⎯were required to publicly share product data about
credit cards, debit cards, deposit accounts, and transaction accounts.232
In the second stage, which came into force in February 2020, the Big
Four are required to share consumer data about these accounts, as well
as data for mortgage accounts.233 In later stages, data sharing
requirements would expand to personal loan and other financial
accounts and also apply to financial institutions beyond the Big Four.234
Finally, Australia’s efforts to govern the handling and sharing of
data go beyond just the financial industry. The Consumer Data Right
Bill specified that the financial industry would be the first industry to
be regulated, but that other industries would also come under its
rules.235 In future years, it is expected that industry-specific rules will
be developed for the energy, phone, and internet sectors.236
While Australia’s open banking rules are still in development,
with many of the most significant obligations yet to come into force, they
give a sense of the range of approaches that are available to
231. See
Banking
Advisory
Committee,
CONSUMER
DATA
STANDARDS,
https://consumerdatastandards.org.au/about/advisory-committee/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/TY5P-JLS2] (describing the Banking Advisory Committee’s role in developing
banking-specific technical standards and supporting the Data Standards Body).
232. See Consumer Data Right Rules – Data Sharing Obligations, Phasing Summary Table,
AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.accc.gov.au/system/
files/Proposed%20CDR%20rules%20-%20Phasing%20table.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7K7-QUMM]
[hereinafter Phasing Summary Table] (scheduling phases for banks’ data sharing obligations by
product type); Competition and Consumer (Consumer Data Right) Rules 2019, AUSTL.
COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N 120 (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.accc.gov.au/
system/files/Proposed%20CDR%20rules%20-%20August%202019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UNHGVUH] [hereinafter Competition and Consumer Rules] (detailing which products are categorized
as phase one products).
233. See Phasing Summary Table, supra note 232 (scheduling banks’ data sharing obligations
for phase two products for February 2020); Competition and Consumer Rules, supra note 232, at
120 (detailing that mortgage offset accounts are phase two products).
234. See Phasing Summary Table, supra note 232 (scheduling banks’ data sharing obligations
for phase two and phase three products); Competition and Consumer Rules, supra note 232, at
120–21 (detailing that personal loan accounts are phase two products and other financial accounts
are phase three products).
235. See Treasury Laws Amendment (Consumer Data Right) Bill 2019 (Cth) 89–90 (Austl.)
(establishing procedures for the banking and energy sectors’ transition to data regulation).
236. See id. (establishing procedures for data regulation in the energy sector).
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governments crafting data autonomy in financial regulation. Unlike the
E.U.’s PSD2 framework, Australia’s rules apply broadly to a wide range
of financial products. Unlike the U.K.’s Open Banking framework, they
extend not just to the largest banks, but also to smaller financial
institutions. And finally, unlike either the E.U.’s or the U.K.’s
regulatory frameworks, Australia’s data rules will eventually apply
outside of just financial institutions, touching the vast majority of
consumer data across sectors. It remains to be seen how effective the
various approaches will prove to be.
III. THE LIMITS OF DATA SHARING
This Part highlights three types of risk that increased financial
data sharing presents and sketches out some initial thoughts on how to
limit these risks. First, data sharing raises a difficult question of
consent, involving how to determine whether a consumer has truly
agreed in an informed way to data sharing arrangements. Second, data
sharing presents a problem of cartelization, regarding how to prevent
financial institutions from colluding with each other. Finally, data
sharing presents a problem of cost, regarding how to pay for the
necessary technological upgrades. None of these problems are
insurmountable, but they do involve tricky questions of law and
economics that must not be ignored by policymakers.
A. Consent
Consent is at the foundation of data sharing.237 If consumers own
their data, then they have the right to share it. Where they agree to
allow others to use their data—whether for better map directions, more
interactive social media accounts, or simply cheaper services—then
data sharing should take place. Where they do not, then data sharing
should be prohibited. Nearly all legislative efforts to improve the
treatment of data have focused on the idea of consumer consent as the
threshold requirement. For example, Europe’s GDPR makes it unlawful
for companies to process data related to an individual unless the
individual has given consent to such processing.238 The U.S.’s Cable
237. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 1423–24 (explaining that individual autonomy is a
fundamental value of informational privacy).
238. See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), art. 6(1)(a), 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR] (“Processing shall be lawful
only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: . . . the data subject has given
consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes . . . .”).
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Communications Policy Act of 1984 prohibits cable companies from
collecting personally identifiable information about individuals without
their prior consent.239 Canada’s Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act requires companies to obtain consent from
users before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information.240 The
underlying assumption behind these requirements is that if companies
are required to receive a consumer’s consent before using their
data, then data will be used in ways that are more beneficial for
the consumer.
But if data autonomy begins with the concept of consent, then a
lot hinges on precisely how consent is defined. If a fintech company
offers a retirement savings tracker, and it includes in its terms and
conditions a provision that it may use your data to “improve its
services,” does this mean that it can sell your data to others in order to
hire better engineers? If an AI startup that analyzes your payments
history to improve your budget states that it may use your payments
history to “develop new features,” does that mean that all of its
employees can examine what you are buying from the grocery store, or
on Amazon, or from the pharmacy, as long as they are working on a
project related to it? And if you delete an account aggregator app like
Mint from your phone, but fail to explicitly tell the company to stop
accessing your data, can the company keep doing so in perpetuity?
The problem here, of course, is that it is remarkably easy to get
consumers to consent to anything on the internet. Numerous studies
show that the vast majority of users fail to read the terms and
conditions of apps and software.241 Consumers use so many different
services now that it would be an overwhelming task to read and process
the sometimes hundred-page agreements that companies impose on
them⎯one study found that it would take the average user seventy-six
work days just to read the terms of service of the websites they visit
239. 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(1).
240. See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c 5, art 6.1
(Can.) (“[T]he consent of an individual is only valid if it is reasonable to expect that an individual
to whom the organization’s activities are directed would understand the nature, purpose and
consequences of the collection, use or disclosure of the personal information to which they
are consenting.”).
241. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1880, 1884 (2013) (noting that most people do not regularly read privacy notices and even
fewer people read end-user license agreements or boilerplate contract terms); George R. Milne &
Mary J. Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t
Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 15, 20–21 (2004) (explaining that 17.3
percent of study participants never read privacy notices and 65.1 percent of “readers” rarely or
sometimes read privacy notices); Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with
Notice and Consent, PROCS. ENGAGING DATA F., Oct. 2009, at 1 (arguing that privacy regulations’
notice and consent provisions are insufficient to attain moral legitimacy).
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over the course of a year.242 Another found that ninety-eight percent of
users failed to notice that the terms of service for a fictitious social
networking service included a clause assigning their first born child to
the network.243 And while the problem of consent in browsewrap and
clickwrap agreements244 is well known among contract scholars, there
are no quick fixes.245 This is more than just a theoretical problem, too.
In 2019, it was discovered that Amazon workers were using Amazon’s
Alexa devices to listen in on conversations in people’s homes⎯Amazon
defended the practice as “help[ing] us train our speech recognition and
natural language understanding systems, so Alexa can better
understand your requests, and ensure the service works well for
everyone.”246 In 2018, Google admitted that employees of third-party
app developers could read people’s Gmail emails⎯the practice was
defended as being consistent with the terms contained in user
agreements.247 In 2018, the New York Times reported that Facebook
was allowing Netflix and Spotify to read Facebook users’ private
messages⎯Facebook defended the practice by arguing that the
companies were simply service providers that allowed users to interact
with one another better.248
While there are no easy solutions here, a few important
principles could help reduce the problem of consent.249 First, consent
242. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4
I/S: J.L. POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 543, 565 (2008) (“[R]eading privacy policies carries costs in time of
approximately 201 hours a year, worth about $3,534 annually per American Internet user.
Nationally, if Americans were to read online privacy policies word-for-word, we estimate the value
of time lost as about $781 billion annually.”).
243. See Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring
the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO. COMMC’N
& SOC’Y 128, 128 (2018).
244. Clickwraps and Browsewraps: What’s the Difference?, OSTERBERG LLC (May 4, 2015),
https://www.osterbergllc.com/clickwraps-and-browsewraps-whats-the-difference/ [https://perma.
cc/63FW-WSTM] (explaining that clickwrap consent requires an overt act by the user, like clicking
an “agree” button, but browsewrap consent is effective if the website’s terms provide that only
users who consent to the terms should access the site).
245. See Solove, supra note 241, at 1882–93 (explaining the cognitive and structural problems
with relying solely on user consent to regulate data privacy).
246. Matt Day, Giles Turner & Natalia Drozdiak, Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You
Tell Alexa, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:34 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-04-10/is-anyone-listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio
[https://perma.cc/
F3BC-6FT6].
247. See Douglas MacMillan, Tech’s ‘Dirty Secret’: The App Developers Sifting Through Your
Gmail, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2018, 11:14 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/techs-dirty-secretthe-app-developers-sifting-through-your-gmail-1530544442 [https://perma.cc/8H9W-A44R].
248. See Gabriel J.X. Dance, Michael LaForgia & Nicholas Confessore, As Facebook Raised a
Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/V7AG-9FWA].
249. This problem is more than just theoretical, as senators have called for investigations of
consent practices in the industry. See Ryan Tracy, Lawmakers Call for Investigation of Fintech
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should be defined as narrowly as possible in order to eliminate the sort
of broad catchall provisions that are too common in user agreements
today. One model here is the GDPR’s definition of consent, which
requires a user’s agreement to be “freely given, specific, informed and
unambiguous.”250 It also considers the context of the consent: in
clarifying comments, the GDPR states, “[w]hen assessing whether
consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether . . . the
performance of a contract . . . is conditional on consent to the
processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of
that contract.”251
Second, consent should be easily revoked, either by creating a
presumption that the deletion of an app amounts to a revocation of
consent or through a prescribed period of time after which renewed
consent must be given. This would help prevent fintech companies from
continuing to gather data after a user stops using the service.252
Finally, given the integral importance of the financial sector to
people’s lives, policymakers should impose more mandatory, rather
than default, rules on the sector. No matter how narrow or limited our
concept of consent, consumers cannot be expected to have the resources
or sophistication necessary to forecast and understand all the potential
risks from data sharing. Therefore, data autonomy in financial
regulation requires a robust set of mandatory rules governing data
sharing, from which parties may not depart even if the consumer agrees
to them. This Article has already highlighted a few of these⎯from
cybersecurity to access to interoperability⎯but more will be needed,
particularly where there is a significant risk of consumer harm. Some
examples might include prohibiting broad indemnification clauses from
consumers, or waivers of the right to sue in court, or unnecessarily
expansive data-use provisions. The CFPB’s guidance on consumer
protection principles in data sharing provides a useful summary of the
key areas of concern.253

Firm Yodlee’s Data Selling, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2020, 1:45 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/lawmakers-call-for-investigation-of-fintech-firm-yodlees-data-selling-11579269600
[https://perma.cc/NQ3K-C27P] (noting that three senators asked the Federal Trade Commission
to investigate Yodlee for potentially selling consumers’ personal financial data without consent).
250. GDPR, supra note 238, art. 4(11).
251. Id. art. 7(4).
252. See Penny Crosman, Is Finra’s Dire Warning About Data Aggregators on Target?, AM.
BANKER (Apr. 9, 2018, 4:54 PM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/is-finras-direwarning-about-data-aggregators-on-target [https://perma.cc/RB5Z-43HU] (explaining privacy
and security risks of allowing financial data aggregators to gather and store consumer
account information).
253. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 107 (highlighting significant consumer
protection challenges as the fintech industry continues to innovate).
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B. Antitrust
Increased data sharing in the financial industry also raises
several antitrust-related concerns.254 The purpose of antitrust law is to
ensure that companies do not engage in anticompetitive conduct.255
While the classic case of such conduct would be the creation of a
monopoly, there are many other ways in which ostensible competitors
can restrict competition among themselves. These include such
practices as price fixing (where competitors agree to sell their goods or
services at a set price or on set terms), bid rigging (where competitors
manipulate prices in a competitive bidding process), and market
allocation (where competitors divide particular sectors of a market
among themselves).256 All of these problematic behaviors are facilitated,
and indeed premised, on information sharing between competing
companies.257 And as the opportunities for such information sharing
increase, so too do the risks.
In some ways, of course, increased data sharing should reduce
concerns about competition in the financial industry. The very purpose
of open banking is to incentivize competition and innovation in the
sector.258 When scholars discuss the antitrust concerns raised by big
data, they typically focus on the problems that are generated when
large players monopolize information and thus make it difficult for
smaller players to compete with them.259 By forcing large players to
share this data with others, data autonomy can mitigate this problem.
Even if large banks possess more data than fintech companies, fintech
companies can gain access to the data through data sharing platforms
254. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., INFORMATION EXCHANGES BETWEEN COMPETITORS
UNDER COMPETITION LAW 2010, at 28–30 (2010) (discussing possible anticompetitive effects of
information exchanges).
255. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) (“The goal
of antitrust is to perfect the operation of competitive markets.”); Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67 (1982) (“[I]t is unanimously agreed that Congress enacted
[antitrust] laws to encourage competition . . . .”).
256. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications
for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513, 533 n.111 (2005) (defining cartel behavior to include
naked price fixing, customer allocation, territorial allocation, and bid-rigging conspiracies).
257. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 254, at 294 (“The antitrust concern is that
information exchanges may facilitate anticompetitive harm by advancing competing sellers’ ability
either to collude or to tacitly coordinate in a manner that lessens competition.”).
258. See Open Banking 2019 Review, OPEN BANKING IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY (2020),
https://www.openbanking.org.uk/about-us/latest-news/open-banking-2019-highlights
[https://
perma.cc/Z68X-AQSR] (“Open Banking was created to enable innovation, transparency and
competition in UK financial services.”).
259. See Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data,
31 YALE J. ON REGUL. 401 (2014) (using Google as a case study to argue “for reorienting many
antitrust investigations in the technology sphere”).
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and thus should have lower costs of entry. As a result, data sharing
provides a helpful way to prevent companies from gaining or abusing
dominant positions in the market.
But while data autonomy might help reduce the concerns over
data monopolization, it simultaneously raises concerns about data
collusion. Data collusion might occur in any number of ways. If financial
institutions can see precisely what their competitors are doing, in terms
of interest rates, loan terms, fees, customer base, and other sensitive
areas, they may be able to reach agreements, either tacit or explicit,
about accepted behaviors in the industry. They might agree to increase
mortgage rates, or decrease the interest paid on checking accounts, or
maintain set transaction fees. The very data that is so valuable to
consumers, and that is essential to opening up financial innovation, is
also quite useful for the purpose of cartelization. And, if used in ways
that are difficult to detect, data sharing between competitors could
provide an impetus for financial institutions to chill competition.
Indeed, the FTC provides the following guidance to companies about
the circumstances in which information exchanges between competitors
become problematic:
The reasonableness of an information exchange depends mainly on the nature of the
information that is shared. The sharing of information relating to price, cost, output,
customers, or strategic planning is more likely to be of competitive concern than the
sharing of less competitively sensitive information. . . . And the sharing of companyspecific data is more likely to raise concerns than the sharing of aggregated data of
multiple firms that does not permit identification of information by company. 260

One of the key considerations that the FTC takes into account
when determining whether an information exchange is likely to harm
competition is whether the exchange “reduc[es] uncertainty about a
rival’s product offerings, prices, and strategic plans.” 261
Again, this is more than just a hypothetical risk. In recent years,
financial institutions have been charged with major price fixing
violations in a range of areas, from the LIBOR interest rate, 262 to the
prices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds,263 to the interest rate on

260. Michael Bloom, Information Exchange: Be Reasonable, FED. TRADE COMM’N:
COMPETITION MATTERS BLOG (Dec. 11, 2014, 11:48 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/
competition-matters/2014/12/information-exchange-be-reasonable [https://perma.cc/FF45-JZW6].
261. Id.
262. See Sharon E. Foster, LIBOR Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations, 11 DEPAUL BUS.
& COM. L.J. 291, 292 (2013).
263. See Mike Leonard, Citi, Other Banks Must Face Fannie-Freddie Bond Price-Fix Suit,
BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 16, 2019, 12:18 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/citi-otherbanks-must-face-fannie-freddie-bond-price-fix-suit [https://perma.cc/7DZL-A586] (reporting that
ten banks allegedly colluded to drive down the price at which they bought unsecured bonds and
pump up the bid prices at which they sold them).
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Treasury bonds,264 to the fees at ATMs.265 The ready availability of data
on competitors’ prices, terms, and conditions will make such
problematic behaviors both easier to engage in and harder to detect.266
Even if there are no formal agreements to engage in price fixing or
similar behavior, competitors might use pricing algorithms that lead to
similar results.267 Regulators will need to be attuned to these risks.
Two features of data sharing regulation could help reduce these
risks. First, under any plausible version of a data sharing rule for
finance, financial institutions can only share consumer financial data
with the third parties that the consumer consents to.268 Only authorized
parties can gain access to consumer financial data, and thus broad
information sharing between competitors would continue to be
prohibited even under a data sharing framework. This rule is not
perfect, of course, because it may well be that a consumer voluntarily
shares financial data from one financial institution with another
competing financial institution. Indeed, large banks have been some of
the biggest investors in the fintech sector in recent years.269 Even if only
a small portion of consumers overlap in financial institutions,
companies could gain significant insight into competitors’ practices.
Second, data sharing regulations must make clear that financial
institutions may only use data for the purposes that the consumer
explicitly authorizes. If a consumer shares loan information from one
financial institution with another firm for the purpose of optimizing the
timing of loan payments, the receiving firm should not be permitted to
use that information to, say, determine the prices of its own loans. This
may well mean that, for large financial institutions with many different
business divisions, companies will need to set up Chinese walls that
prevent teams in one division from seeing the data that other divisions
264. See Kevin Dugan, Justice Department Probes Banks for Rigging Treasuries Market, N.Y.
POST (June 8, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2015/06/08/department-of-justice-probestreasuries-market/ [https://perma.cc/77HL-WZ3N].
265. See ATM Group Sues Visa, Mastercard over Price Fixing, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2011, 5:55
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/visa-mastercard-suit-idUSN1E79B22I20111012 [https://
perma.cc/F28A-BQ76] (explaining that ATM operators sued Visa and Mastercard for allegedly
fixing the prices of ATM fees).
266. See Magnuson, supra note 62, at 358–59 (noting possible antitrust risks raised by the use
of artificial intelligence algorithms in finance).
267. In the 1990s, for example, the Department of Justice concluded that airlines had created
a computerized booking system that led them to collude on prices. See Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E.
Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1775, 1786 (2017).
268. See discussion supra Section II.E (discussing lessons from international data
privacy rules).
269. See Kate Rooney, Wall Street Banks Are Upping Bets on Their Potential Fintech
Competitors, CNBC (Sept. 15, 2019, 9:30 AM CDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/15/wall-streetbanks-are-upping-bets-on-potential-fintech-competitors.html [https://perma.cc/69EG-VMDX].
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receive. Siloing information is not perfectly effective, of course, but
there is evidence that it can reduce opportunistic use of information.270
Needless to say, these proposals will not resolve the antitrust
concerns raised by data sharing in the financial world. Regulators will
need to devise ways to identify and sanction firms that attempt to use
consumer data for anticompetitive purposes. Similarly, they will need
to clarify the kinds of information exchanges that are permitted and the
range of behaviors that are not. Data sharing regulation must not be
used as an excuse for financial collusion.
C. Cost
Another major issue created by an open banking framework is
the problem of cost. Forcing financial institutions to adopt new data
sharing technologies will impose substantial costs on them. It is hoped
that these costs are more than compensated for by the benefits of
increased consumer options and the incentives to create innovative new
financial services. But those benefits are amorphous and long-term,
while the costs are direct and immediate. And while the costs may
be easily borne by large actors, smaller actors will be more
burdened. Finding ways to pay for these expenses will be important to
ensuring compliance.
As an initial matter, it may be helpful to examine just how
expensive data sharing is for financial institutions. It is important to
recognize that the transition to a data-sharing-enabled financial sector
will involve expense. In the U.K., the funding needs of the Open
Banking Implementation Entity were £28 million in 2017 and rose to
£39 million in 2018.271 Some estimate that the total cost of the
transition could exceed £100 million.272 The Australian bank Westpac
estimated that implementing Australia’s open banking platform would

270. On the effectiveness of information barriers, see Andrew F. Tuch, Financial
Conglomerates and Information Barriers, 39 J. CORP. L. 563, 583–85 (2014); Martin Lipton &
Robert B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 459, 462 (1975) (“[T]he Chinese Wall is generally the best solution to the inside information
problems created by a single multiservice firm’s performing potentially conflicting roles . . . .”);
Massimo Massa & Zahid Rehman, Information Flows Within Financial Conglomerates: Evidence
from the Banks-Mutual Funds Relation, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 288, 305 (2008) (noting that Chinese
walls were designed to wall in information obtained from one department and prevent it from
being disseminated throughout the firm); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness
of Chinese Walls in Securities Firms, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 387 (2008) (finding that Chinese
walls in securities firms are porous).
271. See Ryan Weeks, The Cost of Open Banking: £81m and Counting, FIN. NEWS (May 30,
2019, 8:48 AM), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/the-cost-of-open-banking-81m-and-counting20190530 [https://perma.cc/ZG34-8DSN].
272. Id.
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cost the bank between $150 and $200 million Australian dollars (or
approximately $100 to $140 million U.S. dollars). 273 These are not
outsized sums for the largest U.S. banks—J.P. Morgan had revenues of
$30 billion just in the second quarter of 2019⎯but they would be
substantial for many smaller regional and community banks.274
Much of these costs, however, stem from the process of
developing the appropriate technological and regulatory standards
through which financial data sharing will take place.275 Once these
standards are in place, the actual implementation of them for any given
bank becomes much simpler. An estimate from the U.K.’s Open Data
Institute concluded that the cost of implementing API access for a
typical bank would be less than £1 million and probably in the “low-tomid hundreds of thousands.”276 While compliance costs might increase
in a data sharing environment, these estimates suggest the overall cost
from a technical standpoint would be reasonable.
Moreover, the transition costs could be lowered by phasing in the
regulatory obligations of data sharing over time. Just as Australia has
structured its data sharing rules to initially only apply to the largest
banks, and only to a portion of their data, the United States might
phase in data sharing obligations to first apply to large banks (such as
the “Big Four” of JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and
Citibank), and later to smaller ones. This approach would have the dual
advantage of requiring the initial costs of transition to be borne by the
financial institutions that have the greatest capacity to bear them,
and also opening up the benefits of data sharing to a large share
of consumers.
The larger costs, of course, are not so much the initial setup costs
of implementing data sharing platforms, but rather the long-term
strategic costs of increased competition from a variety of fintech

273. See Asha Barbaschow, Westpac Predicts Open Banking to Cost AU$200m to Implement,
ZDNET (Oct. 12, 2018, 3:52 PM GMT), https://www.zdnet.com/article/westpac-predicts-openbanking-to-cost-au200m-to-implement/ [https://perma.cc/88SG-87XK].
274. See Hugh Son, JP Morgan Posts an Earnings Beat, but Forecast on Interest Income
Disappoints, CNBC (July 16, 2019, 6:23 AM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/16/jp-morganearnings-q2-2019.html [https://perma.cc/MB3B-XRML].
275. See Weeks, supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the cost of implementing
open banking in the U.K.).
276. OPEN DATA INST. & FINGLETON ASSOCS., DATA SHARING AND OPEN DATA FOR BANKS: A
REPORT FOR HM TREASURY AND CABINET OFFICE 87 (2014), https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/382273/141202_API_Re
port_FINAL.PDF[https://perma.cc/X3Q8-LVXB].
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startups.277 Forcing banks to share data with companies that are
potentially competitors creates a threat to the business models of
financial institutions. Fintech companies could erode profit margins by
alerting customers to better investments elsewhere or taking control
over more financial transactions. Financial institutions might need to
find new ways to generate revenue or they might become less profitable.
Forcing banks to bear the cost of creating accessible technological
platforms (such as APIs) would allow them to spread the cost over all of
its business lines and customers, rather than offload it onto the
consumers that need the access in the first place, but it would still
be costly.
Yet the mere fact that data sharing could change the business
model of financial institutions is not sufficient to conclude that doing so
is undesirable. There are many behaviors in the financial markets that
might be profitable for financial institutions to do in the absence of
regulation, but that are prohibited, either for reasons of fairness, or
efficiency or stability. The important question to ask is whether the
regulation encourages free and fair competition in a way that will
benefit consumers. This Article argues that it does.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the clarion call of data privacy has
led policymakers and scholars to ignore the broader importance of data.
The emphasis on protecting consumer data from exposure has created
a situation in which consumers are prevented from being able to access,
use, and share their data in convenient and transparent ways. As a
result, innovation and competition suffers. The financial sector provides
a particularly striking example of this problem. Large asymmetric
information and search and switch costs make it hard for consumers to
identify and use better financial products. Banks can thus hold up
customers with higher prices, worse services, and fewer options without
facing strong competition. While fintech companies could potentially
resolve these problems, they face one nearly insurmountable barrier:
they lack access to the financial data they need. And given the
inefficiencies in the market, it is unlikely that purely private sector
efforts can overcome this problem. Therefore, this Article argues, we
must recast financial regulation in a way that focuses on data
277. See Laura Brodsky, Chris Ip & Tobias Lundberg, Open Banking’s Next Wave: Perspectives
from Three Fintech CEOs, MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/financial-services/our-insights/open-bankings-next-wave-perspectives-from-threefintech-ceos [https://perma.cc/R5FD-FUF8] (discussing the ways in which fintech innovation is
forcing banks to produce new products at low cost).
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autonomy. Data autonomy will require clear rules on data ownership,
data access, and data liability, and it will require renewed attention to
the way that data is protected. While these changes will not be easy or
cheap, they hold tremendous potential to drive innovation and
competition for the benefit of consumers.

